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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78A-3-102(j). This matter has been assigned to the Court of Appeals
from the Utah Supreme Court.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) 1 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee
presents the following issues pertinent to this appeal.
Issue I:

In alleging fraud, may a lender reasonably rely on a borrower's

representation that an encumbered horse is un-encumbered even though the lender did not
search UCC filings and the UCC filings included a financing statement for a lien on the
horse?
Standard of Review:

Reasonable reliance is a factual "matter within the province of

the [finder of fact]." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 34, 70 P.3d
35. On an appeal from a bench trial, "appellate courts may not set aside trial court's
findings of fact 'unless clearly erroneous.' To successfully demonstrate that a factual
finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in favor of the
factual finding and show that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to support the finding.
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Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous reviewing courts must give
due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the (credibility of the witnesses.'"
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f27, 54 P.3d 1119; See also Utah Rules of Civ. Pro. R.
52(a).
Controlling Law: Robinson v. Tripco Investments, 2000 UpT App. 200, 21 P.3d 219;
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983);
Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Issue II:

Did Keetch sufficiently marshal the evidence iiji asserting that the trial

court erred in finding that the Timothy's testimony was credible when Mrs. Timothy
testified that it was "always implied" that the horse, "He's a Son of a Dun/' was unencumbered?
Standard of Review:

On an appeal from a bench trial, "appellate courts may not set

aside trial court's findings of fact 'unless clearly erroneous.' To successfully demonstrate
that a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must imarshal all the evidence in
favor of the factual finding and show that, even when viewe4 in the light most favorable
to the trial court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to support the
finding. Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly Erroneous, reviewing courts
must give 'due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court t0 judge the credibility of the
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witnesses."5 Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f27, 54 P.3d 1119; 566 Utah Rules of Civ.
Pro. R. 52(a).
Controlling Law: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a), Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT
84, 54 P.3d 1119; Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35; Friends
ofMapleton Mt. Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, 650 Utah Adv. Rep. 28; Jensen v.
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325.

Issue III:

May the Keetches contest an award of attorney fees on appeal when they

failed to brief this issue?
Standard of Review and Controlling Law: "Petitioners seeking judicial review must
identify the legal or factual errors of the lower court or agency." Utah appellate courts
"have consistently declined to review issues that are not adequately briefed... [I]t is
improper to f?mak[e] blanket assertions and leav[e] the responsibility to the court to ferret
out evidence from the record to support [them]." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (In re. Questar
Gas Co.) 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545. "[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an
action is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Kealamakia, Inc. v.
Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13.

Issue IV:

Are the Timothys entitled to their attorneys fees incurred on appeal?
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Standard of Review/ Controlling Law:

Parties mus|: make a specific request for

attorneys fees incurred on appeal. Utah R. of App. Pro. R. 34(a)(9). The Timothys are
entitled to attorneys fees incurred on appeal on the same basis as those awarded at the
trial court level. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT ll,lf27,|40P.3d \\\9\ Doctors' Co.
v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,1J32, 218 P.3d 598.

Issue V:

Are the trial court's alleged errors harmless because they will not change

the outcome of the case?
Standard of Review/ Controlling Law: No error in either tfre admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or ih anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a|new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stagelof the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties. Utah R. of Civ. Pr. R. 61. Errors we label "harmless" are errors which,
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 11$, 120 (Utah 1989); Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 22, 70 P.3d 35.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a): "...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses..." See Addendum, Exh. "A".
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24: "...The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award." See Addendum, Exh. "B"
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 61: "No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. R. 61. See Addendum, Exh. "C"
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11 U.S.C. 523(a): "...discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b), or 1328 (b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor...." See Addendum Exh. "D"

STATEMENT OF THE CASt
Under Utah Rules of Appell. Pro. R. 24(b)(1), Lender is satisfied with Borrower's
statement of the case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Underlying Findings of Fact
In the summer of 2000, Defendant/Appellants Thomas and Teri Keetch (the
"Keetches") "borrowed $102,000 from MSF Properties and gave MSF Properties a lien
on a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun" (the "Horse"). The payoff on that note was in
excess of $123,000 as of September 21, 2001. (R. 1022)
In August or early September 2000, Teri Keetch and Thomas Keetch contacted
Paul and Janice Timothy (the "Timothy's), through Rebecca Mendenhall, and asked Paul
and Janice Timothy for a loan. (R. 1022)
Teri Keetch met with Paul Timothy at the McDonald's in Lehi, Utah. At that
meeting, "Paul Timothy was acting on his own behalf and also as the agent for his wife in
investigating the terms and conditions of the loan. At that meeting, Teri Keetch solicited
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a loan from Paul and Janice Timothy. The loan amount was to be $83,500." (R. 1022)
"Teri Keetch told Paul Timothy that she had a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun that she
could use as collateral to secure the loan." (R. 1021) After the meeting, "Teri Keetch
showed Paul Timothy the horse named Hesa Son of a Dun. Teri Keetch told Paul
Timothy that she owned the horse and that the horse was worth between $125,000 and
$175,000. By stating that she owned Hesa Son of a Dun and by offering to pledge the
horse as collateral and by stating the value of the horse, Teri Keetch asserted that she
owned the horse and that it was hers to pledge and that she held enough equity in the
horse to secure the loan she wanted from Paul and Janice Timothy." (R. 1021). That
assertion was false because she had previously agreed to place a lien on Hesa Son of a
Dun in the amount of $123,000. If "Hesa Son of a Dun was worth only $125,000 Teri
Keetch held only $2,000 in equity in the horse. If Hesa Son of a Dun was worth $175,000
she had only $77,000 in equity in the horse. In either case, her equity in the horse was a
lower figure than the amount of the loan she was soliciting from Paul Timothy." (R.
1020-1021).
"At the meeting at McDonalds, Paul Timothy specifically asked Teri Keetch if the
Keetches owned Hesa Son of a Dun free and clear and Teri Keetch replied that she and
her husband owned the horse free and clear. That representation was false." (R. 1021).
At the meeting at McDonald's, "Teri Keetch told Paul Timothy that she needed the
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loan in the amount of $83,500 in order to help her get her business started. Based upon
the fact that only a small portion of the loan went for business purposes/' the trial court
was "persuaded that Teri Keetch's assertion as to the purpose of the loan was false." (R.
1021).
Following that meeting, "Paul Timothy took several steps to determine whether he
and Janice should loan the money to Thomas and Teri Keetch. Some of the steps he took
were:
a.

Paul Timothy spoke with Jake Stephens regarding the value of Hesa Son of
a Dun, the income potential of the horse and whether Jake Stephens was
aware of any lienholders on the horse;

b.

Paul Timothy called the American Quarter Horse Association and
determined that according to their records, Thomas and Teri Keetch owned
Hesa Son of a Dun and that the AQHA showed no liens on the horse."

(R. 1020).
"Mr. Timothy testified that he was not familiar with the UCC filing system and did
not know that it was possible to search the UCC filing system to determine whether a
horse was owned free and clear. This testimony was consistent with Mr. Timothy's
experience. Mr. Timothy owned several horses and was familiar with the AQHA and the
fact that the AQHA registered owners and even liens. In his experience with horses, he
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had never heard of a UCC filing on a horse." (R. 1021).
On "September 28, 2001, Paul Timothy and Thomas Keetch met at the office of
Rebecca Mendenhall. During that meeting, Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch several
questions. Thomas Keetch gave false answers to those questions. Specifically:
a.

Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch the purpose for the loan. Thomas
Keetch informed him that Thomas and Teri Keetch needed exactly $83,500
for business purposes. Within a day or two, Thomas Keetch had used some
of the money to purchase new tires for his personal vehicle, to register his
personal vehicle, to pay the mortgage on a rental property, to pay his
personal mortgage and to make somewhere between $15,000 and $30,000
in payments to Carol Brown. The court was persuaded by clear and
convincing evidence that when Thomas Keetch told Paul Timothy, on
September 28, 2001, that he needed the precise sum of $83,500 for business
purposes, Thomas Keetch was not being truthful.

b.

Paul Timothy asked Thomas Keetch if Hesa Son of a Dun was owned free
and clear. Thomas Keetch replied that the horse was owned by Thomas and
Teri Keetch free and clear. That statement was false."

(R. 1020-1018).
"On September 28, 2001, Paul Timothy, Janice Timothy, Thomas Keetch and Teri
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Keetch all signed a promissory note." (R. 1018). The promissory note stated that "Hesa
Son of a Dun would be offered as collateral on the loan and Thomas and Teri Keetch
agreed not to move the horse until the loan was paid off. By agreeing to a contract with
that term, Thomas and Teri Keetch represented to Paul and Janice Timothy that they
owned Hesa a Son of a Dun, that they were free to offer the horse as collateral and that
they had enough equity in the horse to secure the principal balance of the promissory
note.1 Those representations were false." (R. 1018).
"Thomas and Teri Keetch entered into a plea in abeyance agreement in which they
plead no contest to criminal charges arising from their actions in this matter." (R. 1017)
As part of the plea in abeyance agreement, they were required to pay $60,000 in
restitution to Paul and Janice Timothy. Thomas and Teri Keetch paid $63,677.93 to Paul
and Janice Timothy as a result of the restitution order in the criminal case. (R. 1017).
The Horse "was seized by MSF Properties in October 2001 and was therefore
unavailable as collateral to secure this loan or to pay Paul or Janice Timothy. (R. 1017).
Skips Suzy Bars, and her unborn foal, were never delivered to Paul and Janice Timothy."
(R. 1017).
No other payments were made on the note. (R. 1017).
1

The promissory note also promised a mare (Skips Suzy Bars) as collateral and the
unborn foal of Skips Suzy Bars as collateral. The evidence at trial showed that these horses were
of very little value and that Hesa a Son of a Dun constituted the vast majority of value offered as
collateral.
14

Procedural Background
Paul and Janice Timothy filed an amended complaint on or around July 11, 2002.
(R. 59). In the amended complaint they alleged several causes of action, including breach
of contract and fraud.
After the complaint was filed but before trial, both Thomas and Teri Keetch
declared bankrptcy in Arizona. The Arizona Bankruptcy court ordered that a trial be held
in Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. (R. 897)
The parties conducted a trial of this matter in the Fourth District Court, Judge
Laycock's courtroom on January 8th, 9th and 13th of 2009. (R: 925, 935 & 941). After
hearing the evidence the court issued a decision and provided the parties with its
Finding's of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment." (R: 1027).
The Timothys then moved for summary judgment in the bankruptcy court. The
Keetches opposed that motion. In opposing the motion, the Keetches filed a brief that is
substantially similar to the brief they have filed on appeal. Addendum, Exh "E". After
considering the arguments of the parties, the bankruptcy court found in favor of the
Timothys, entering judgment in against the Keetches and finding that the debt was not
dischargeable. Addendum, Exh. "F".
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Findings of the Trial Court Regarding
Misrepresentation, False Pretenses and Reasonable Reliance
The trial court found in favor of Paul and Janice Timothy on the issue of breach of
contract (R. 1017-1013). The court made the following statement in regards to the
Keetch's misrepresentations regarding Plaintiffs breach of contract: "[t]hese false
statements do show that Thomas and Teri Keetch obtained the loan under false
pretenses." (R. 1009). The judgment also found in favor of Paul and Janice Timothy on
the issue of fraud, but only to the extent that Thomas and Teri Keetch had made a
misrepresentation regarding the issue of whether Hesa Son of a Dun was owned free and
clear at the time of the Timothy loan or whether Hesa Son of a Dun had a lien on him.
(R. 1013-1010). Notably, the court also noted that the "...damages awarded to the
plaintiffs under the cause of action for fraud are identical to the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs under their breach of contract." (R. 1011).
The trial court made the following findings on the issue of reasonable reliance:
47. Paul and Janice Timothy were reasonable in relying upon the
misrepresentation. Paul and Janice timothy acted reasonably because Paul
Timothy specifically checked with the horse's trainer, Jake Stephens and was
informed that Thomas and Teri Keetch owned Hesa Son of Dun and was informed
that Jake Stephens was unaware of any lien on the horse. Paul Timothy also called
the American Quarter Horse Association2 and was told that the AQHA had no
2

The AQHA is somewhat similar to the American Kennel Club. The AQHA maintains
ownership, lien and breeding records for quarter horses. If a quarter horse is not registered with
the AQHA it's fair market value is reduced. (T:387:13-25).
16

record of any lien on Hesa Son of a Dun. Paul Timothy also asked both Thomas
and Teri Keetch and was informed by both of them that they owned Hesa Son of a
Dun free and clear of all liens.
48. Thomas and Teri Keetch argued at trial that Paul and Janice Timothy were not
reasonable because they failed to discover a UCC filing showing a lien on Hesa
Son of a Dun. Paul and Janice Timothy testified that they were not familiar with
the UCC filing system and did not know that they should check that system. The
law of the state of Utah does not require a victim of misrepresentation to inspect
the public record to verify the truthfulness of the statement made by the defendant.
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983).
In Robinson v. Tripco, 2000 UT App 200, the Appellate Court analyzed the
doctrine of reasonable reliance. The court quoted Conder v. A.L. Williams &
Assocs. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for the assertion that "a plaintiff
may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without independent
investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should make it
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is
required to make his own investigation." In applying the reasoning of both Tripco
and Conder, this court concludes that Paul and Janice Timothy were justified in
not doing a UCC search. Both Thomas and Teri Keetch represented to Paul
Timothy (and Janice through him) that Hesa Son of a Dun was not encumbered.
There were no red flags that arose during the Timothy's investigation that should
have alerted them to the fact that the representation was false. Therefore, Paul and
Janice Timothy were not required to investigate the truthfulness of the
representation.
(R:1011-1012).
The Court found the Timothys credible on these points, viewing the small
discrepancies in their testimony as less material because their "memories have faded to
some extent55 (R: 1023).
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The Court's Findings Re: Credibility of the Witnesses:
The Court found that Thomas and Teri Keetch were not credible witnesses. In
regards to Thomas Keetch, it stated, "[d]uring his testimony, Thomas Keetch appeared to
attempt to be as evasive as possible. It appeared that he was working hard to be vague.
Thomas Keetch also testified differently during trial than he did during his deposition.
Based upon these contradictions, his demeanor during trial and other false statements (as
will be explained below) this court concludes that Thomas Keetch was not a trustworthy
witness." (R: 1026). The court specifically found that Thomas Keetch informed Paul
Timothy that he needed $83,500.00 to start a business and that he used loan proceeds for
non-business purposes. (R: 1018, 1019). Based on the evidence at trial, the Court, as
noted above, also found that Thomas Keetch's representations about encumbrances on the
Horse, the purpose of the loan, and the bankruptcy were fals^.
In regards to Teri Keetch, the court found that she changed her testimony with
regards to the seizure of Hesa Son of a Dun. (R: 1025). The Court found that Teri was
not credible when Teri testified that she and Thomas Keetch paid off the MSF loans.
(R: 1025). The court found that Teri was dishonest on her bankruptcy filing. Id. The
court also stated that Teri Keetch was not a credible witness in regards to the loan and the
purpose of the loan. (R: 1021). In sum, the court noted that Teri Keetch had
misrepresented her plan to start a "horse therapy" business, had misrepresented the exact
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sum of money she needed on the loan, and had misrepresented facts about her bankruptcy
history. (R: 1010). These findings are supported by the evidence from trial as indicated
below:
a. The Inconsistent Testimony of Thomas Keetch:
Thomas Keetch testified that he was "not for sure" if he used the loan proceeds to
meet payments on his home. (T: 25: 15-17). He went on to say that he did use the loan
proceeds to pay off his mortgage. (T: 26: 8-11). He also stated that he didn't know if he
paid $10,000 from the loan proceeds towards rental property (T:28: 11-14). He corrected
this testimony by stating that he had paid $10,000 towards the rental property. (T:29: 2)
(emphasis added). He also stated that he didn't feel that telling the court where the loan
proceeds went was "relevant." (T:29: 4-6). He also testified that he "didn't know" if he
had paid $15,000 to Carol Brown. (T:30: 2). Then he testified that he "thought it was
ten." (T:30: 4). Then he admitted that in his deposition he had, in fact, testified that he
paid "$15,000 to Carol Brown, his mother in law. (T:30: 8-10). Then he testified that he
"possibly" used the loan proceeds to register his car. (T:33: 2-4). He went on to state that
he paid $5,000 in earnest money to a real estate broker. Id at 11-14 . He then stated that
he had used the loan proceeds to purchase new tires on his personal vehicle but that this
expenditure was business related because it would help him set up a "therapeutic ranch".
(T: 34: 3-12).
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He also stated that he had paid the Timothy's over $70,000 in restitution for
payment on a note. (T: 38: 1-4). He then stated that he didn't know if he had paid that
amount. (T: 41: 24-25; 42: 1-7). He testified that he "had nothing to do..." with
arranging for the loan. (T: 47: 15-25). He testified that he signed the promissory note
and the court admitted copies of the signed note into evidence (T: 34: 13-24). Then he
testified that he entered into the initial loan with MSF Properties (T: 51: 20-24). He
testified that the horse was "worth $125,000 to $175,000," but that he only listed the
horses value at $50,000 on his bankruptcy petition. (T: 58: 15-17; 60: 17-20). He later
stated this represented his equity in the horse, but then changed that to the horse's "fire
sale value." (T: 88: 15-18). He also testified that he "put down an inaccurate amount of
monthly income" on his bankruptcy petition. (T: 62: 11-13). Timothy Keetch testified
that "...I never talked to the Timothys. I never said anything to them.yy (44: 23-24)
(emphasis added). He later testified that he did meet both Paul and Janice Timothy at the
offices of Becky Mendenhall. (T: 72: 14-17). Additionally Jake Stephens testified that
Thomas and Teri Keetch were present when Paul Timothy came to look at He's a Son of
a Dun. (T: 176: 12-23).
b. The Inconsistent Testimony of Teri Keetch
Teri testified that she did not tell "Paul and Janice Timothy that" she "owned" a
horse named "Skip (Suzy) Bars" when she entered a loan agreement with them. (T: 98:
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11-17). When presented with contrary statements from her deposition, she then stated
that her deposition was "inaccurate" because she had not made that statement to the
Timothy's, but "...was referring to Becky." (T: 98: 5-9). Teri testified that she did not
disclose to the Timothy's that she was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and that
"He's a Son of a Dun had been previously collateralized." (T: 105:24-25; 106: 1). In
fact, Paul Timothy testified that Teri Keetch told him that "she and her husband owned
the stallion free and clear." (T: 377: 14-15). Paul Timothy's testimony reveals that she
was lying:
A.

as a follow-up question I said, Is the stallion encumbered in any way? And
she said not. I asked her if the stallion was fully paid off. And she said he
was. (T: 377: 21-23).

Later, Mr Timothy testified as follows: "I asked her, once again, if the stallion was
encumbered. I also asked her if she had ever declared bankruptcy, and she told me she
had not. I said, have you or your husband or together have you ever declared bankruptcy?
And she indicated that she had never done that." (T: 377: 25; 378: 1-4). Janice was
present at the September 28131, 2001 meeting, but she did not personally discuss the
bankruptcy with Thomas Keetch. (T: 281:23-282:1).
Teri Keetch also testified that she never told the Timothys the estimated value of
"He's a Son of Dun". She went on to testify that she did not tell "...Paul Timothy that
[she] needed the money from this loan so that [she] could buy some therapy horses..." (T:
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I l l : 14-17) (parenthetical added for clarity). Later, she testified, "...[t]he only discussion
that Mr. Timothy and I had at McDonald's was he asked me briefly about the nonprofit,
and so I may have told him in that, that we would be purchasing therapy horses for that
business." (T: 113: 5-10)(emphasis added). This is different than testimony she gave on
the third day of trial when she stated, "I don't recall discussing any mares with him at
McDonald's" (T: 482: 12-13). Later, Teri Keetch also testified that, in fact, the purpose
of the loan was not "...to help save some horses." (T: 117: 16-19). On the third day of
trial she also offered the following testimony regarding the McDonald's conversation.
Q.

And your answer in your deposition was, "And I probably did say
something like, you know, we are trying to get the nonprofit organization
and we need to purchase the therapy horses."
A.
Correct. And I believe I said earlier in testimony that I don't recall
discussing my mares at all. We may have - he may have - we did talk
about the nonprofit organization, as I said in my testimony earlier, and if we
did it would have been, but, ultimately, that is our goal is to purchase
therapy horses. We can't have a therapy ranch without therapy horses.
Q.
Okay. I had asked you in your deposition, page 157, line 10, "All right.
And isn't it true that that is probably a little bit misleading to the Timothys
in that they thought that the money would be used to purchase those
horses?" And your answer was?
A.
"Yeah, if that's what they thought, that is misleading."
(T: 483: 3-20).
In fact, Paul Timothy stated that he was led to believe his loan was being used to
purchase horses when he testified, "She indicated that's the amount she needed to 'save
herherd.'"T:376: 14-15).
Teri Keetch also testified that she did not disclose the "bankruptcy" or that she
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"owed money to MSF Properties," and that she had "secured that loan with He's a Son of
Dun..." (T: 118: 17-25). Teri also testified differently then Thomas regarding her
signatures on some of the loan documents:
Q.
A.

Your husband, Tom, testified that you did sign it. Was he not being
accurate in his testimony when he testified that you signed it?
Yeah, I don't know if he remembers accurately, But, no, that's not my
signature.
(T: 123:20-24).

She also testified differently than she did in her deposition as was pointed out:
A.

Well, he called me at work to see if he could bring this back to my work for
me to sign it, and I told him that I didn't - 1 had already used my break and
I didn't have a break, and Becky asked if he could sign it for me, and I said
I have no problem with that if that's allowed, if that's okay. And she said,
Yeah, if he has your permission. And so I said Yeah, you can. (T: 124)

Later, she testified regarding her deposition as follows:
Q.

A.

On line No. 8 I asked you the question, "Okay. Are you aware, were you
aware at the time that somebody was signing your name on this?" And your
answer to that was?
"No, not on that day, no."

(T: 125:25-126: 1-3).
Later, she testified that she had not paid $20,000 to $30,000 of the loan proceeds
directly to her mother (T: 136: 21-23). But, later she stated that in deposition she had
paid "either $20,000 or $35,000ff to her Mom. (T: 137: 1-6). She also testified that she
had no interest in Keetch Ranch when she stated:
Q.

And you have testified previously under oath that you have no managerial
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A.
Q.
A.

interest in Keetch Ranch, Inc., correct?
Correct.
And you have testified previously under oath that you are not an employee
of Keetch Ranch, Inc., correct?
Correct (T: 145: 17-22).

Despite this, her brother, Kelli Crestani testified about the ranch as follows:
Q.
Did she tell you it (the Keetch Ranch) was her business?
A.
Yes.
(T: 204: 14-15)(parenthetical added for clarity)
Kelli Crestani, Teri's own brother, also testified that he thought Teri Keetch lied in
her deposition. (T: 208: 11-12). Finally, her testimony differed significantly from Jake
Stephen's. He stated in his testimony as follows:
...I went up to the police officer and said, What's going on? This is my place.
And they just said, We have the paperwork, or whatever, to repossess this horse.
And so I don't know anything about paperwork, but I looked it over and I asked
the cop, Can he do this? And he said, he has the right stuff, you know.
And so I went and called Teri, and I said, Hey, I don't know what the deal is here,
but there is some people here to pick up this horse. And she said, Well, call the
cops and say that it is stolen. And I said, Well, I don't know these people, but
there is a cop here already, and they say they have the paperwork to take it. And
she said, Well, tell them they are trying to steal it. And I said, I don't know how
this works, but I said, There is a cop here already. I can't tell them it's stolen, you
know. (T: 181: 1-15).
In regards to the seizure, Teri Keetch stated, "Jake called me after He's a Son of a
Dun was already gone, so / wasn't even aware that it was taking place." (T: 158:9-10)
(emphasis added). Jake Stephens also testified that he had "heard some things" about
Teri Keetch being dishonest. (T: 184: 11-12). Mr Stephen's went onto say that Teri
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Keetch had a reputation as a "habitual liar" in the community. (T: 184: 13). Moreover,
Jake Stephens testified that she had given him a check even though the checking account
to be drawn against was already closed. (T: 183: 11-12).
c. The Events Re-counted by Paul and Janice Timothy:
Paul Timothy testified that after meeting Teri Keetch at McDonalds, he "...called
the American Quarter Horse Association and asked them if there were any liens on He's a
Son of a Dun or any of the mares that she had in her brood there. (T: 381: 9-12).
Additionally, Paul Timothy explained:
[0]ur house was pretty well paid off. We were taking a second mortgage on the
house. I was nearing retirement, and certainly couldn't afford to give up
$83,500.00 if she couldn't pay the loan back. She assured me there would be no
problem.
Q.

Okay. So you decided to make a loan to the Keetches. Where did you
come up with the money to do that?

A.

We took out a second on the house. (T:383: 1-7).

Additionally, Paul Timothy testified as follows regarding his conversation with
Teri Keetch: "I asked him if the stallion was free and clear. He indicated that she was. I
said, '[T]om, are there any encumbrances on this stallion at all?' He said none. I asked
him if it was fully paid off? He assured me it was." (T:385: 6-9). Janice corroborated
this testimony stating that it had always been "implied" that there was no encumbrances
and that the Keetches had not disclosed any encumbrances on September 28th, 2001. (T:
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280: 11-23). To investigate the issue, the Timothys asked the trainer of the horse who
also said he was not aware of any lien on the horse. (T: 380: 8-16). He also contacted the
American Quarter Horse Association ("AQHA") and inquired whether the Horse had any
liens. (T: 381: 8-18)
Paul Timothy also testified about the use of the loan proceeds: "Incidentally, I
asked Teri and I asked Tom, I said, Is any of this money going for anything else other
than these brood mares? They assured me that that was not the case." (T: 390: 1-5).
Janice Timothy agreed with this testimony when she testified that she understood the
Keetches would use the money for their Mares only. (T: 272t 17-25)
Paul Timothy also testified as follows regarding the UCC filing:
Q.
A.

There was some talk about a UCC filing. Had you ever seen a UCC filing.?
I had no idea what it was. (T: 390: 20-22).

The Court noted that "[i]t never occurred to me (Judge Laycock) that you could do
a UCC filing on a living animal." (T: 561: 6-7) (parenthetical added).
Later Paul Timothy testified that He's a Son of a Dun was seized by the other
creditor. (T:393: 15-18). This left the Timothy's with "no recourse" to re-collect their
money. (T: 394: 15-16). When Paul Timothy presented this unfortunate situation to Teri
Keetch she just "smiled like she always does." (T: 397: 24).
d. The Court Concluded that the Keetches are not credible.
The court made the following findings at trial, prior to entering the Findings of
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Fact Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. The Court stated,
...my very specific impression of Mr. Keetch was that he was attempting to be as
evasive as possible...his answers were vague. He didn't remember. He didn't
want to make a commitment very often to anything. And on the whole, in the end,
when it comes down to critical elements of his testimony to the issues that are
really critical to my decision, I don't find that he is a trustworthy reporter of facts,
because he was doing his best not to do anything that could possibly help the
plaintiffs, and in the process he hurt himself. (T: 546: 19-25; 547: 1-3)
..When it comes to Mrs. Keetch, there are times in her testimony when I thought
she said things that were just totally unbelievable. (T: 547: 16-17).
The court did note that there were conflicts with the Timothy's testimony,
however, it found these conflicts less "material". (T: 551: 4). This was just after the
court noted that "I'm very cognizant of the fact that this is over seven years ago, and that
everybody's memories can be very vague at this point..." (T: 547: 10-11).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) 1 Appellee has submitted its own statement of the issues.
The Keetches' first and second issue state:
Does a UCC filing which gives notice that a horse is collateral for an existing loan
provide constructive notice, which precludes a party who failed to search the UCC
records from asserting a claim for fraud (ie. reasonable reliance) based upon a
claim that the defendants misrepresented to them that the horse was encumbered?
Are plaintiffs precluded from asserting fraud who underwent an investigation of
whether the horse was the subject of a lien or collateral for an existing loan,
however, as part of their investigation failed to search UCC filings? Appellant's
Brief, p. 4.
The Timothys believe these two issues are best articulated as the single, following issue:
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In alleging fraud, may a lender reasonably rely on a borrower's representation that
an encumbered horse is un-encumbered even though the lender did not search
UCC filings and the UCC filings included a financing statement for a lien on the
horse?
The Keetches have argued that the Timothys had access to the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") filings. Because of this access, the Timothys should have
known that a third party had placed a lien on the Keetch's horse even after the Keetches
told the Timothys that the horse was unencumbered. The UCC provides notice to lenders
who wish to secure their loans with livestock. It also provides an ordered way to resolve
priority disputes between lenders who have secured loans on the same livestock.
However, there is no legal support for the suggestion that a UCC filing eliminates a
lender's cause of action for fraud. As an element of fraud, reasonable reliance is not
eliminated simply because a UCC filing contradicts the misrepresentation that the
Timothy's relied on. Alleging reasonable reliance does not generally impart a duty to
conduct an investigation as to whether a representation was fraudulent. This is true unless
something placed a person of reasonable intelligence on notice of the fraud. People of
reasonable intelligence don't know about the intricacies of UCC financing statements for
horse liens. The Timothys did not know about the UCC filing system, much less the
horse lien in this case. The Timothys' reliance on the Keetches misrepresentation was
reasonable.
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The Keetches have suggested that the Court erred in finding that their testimony
was not credible. There is no evidence supporting this conclusion. The court is in the
best position to make this determination, and the record supports the Court's finding.
Additionally, the Keetches failed to brief their arguments on attorneys fees. The
court should not hear any arguments on attorneys fees, and under R. 24 of Appellate
Procedure, neither Lender nor Borrower may raise the issue of attorneys fees in this
appeal except as directed in R. 24(a)(9). Pursuant to this rule, the Timothys request their
attorneys fees incurred on appeal.
Finally, any error made by the trial court is harmless because the court arrived at
the same result on the Timothys' independent action for breach of contract. The Keetches
have not appealed that finding. The judgment will stand against the Keetches regardless
of the outcome of this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TIMOTHYS REASONABLY RELIED ON THE KEETCHES
REPRESENTATION THAT THE HORSE WAS UN-ENCUMBERED EVEN
THOUGH THEY DID NOT SEARCH UCC FILINGS.
The Timothys' reliance on the Keetches was reasonable. Reasonable reliance is a

factual "matter within the province of the jury." Armed Forces ins. Exchange v.
Harrison, 2003 UT 14,1J34, 70 P.3d 35. For the Keetches to have the trial court's finding
overturned, they must marshal all the evidence and establish by clear and convincing
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evidence that even when viewed in a light most favorable to (the trial court, the findings of
fact are clearly erroneous. Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84,^[27, 54 P.3d 1119. This
standard has not been met. When they made a claim for fraud, the Timothys' reasonably
relied on the Keetches representations about the horse even though they didn't search the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") filings. In points one and two of the Keetches
brief, they argue that the presence of the UCC filing provided "constructive notice" to the
Timothys that the Horse was encumbered. They also argue that because the Timothys had
"constructive notice" of the encumbrance, they could not reasonably rely on the
Timothys' misrepresentation that the horse was unencumbered. The Keetches cite J.R.
Simplot Company et. al. v. Sales Kine Intl. et. al, in support of their argument. J.R.
Simplot Company et. al. v. Sales Kine Intl. et. ah, 2000 UT 92, 17 P.2d 1100. J.R.
Simplot Company has nothing to do with fraud, constructive notice or reasonable reliance.
See e.g. Id. In JR. Simplot, the court determined that a fertilizer company which had
perfected a security interest in a farm's crops by filing a security interest with the
Division of Corporations had priority over a distributor who did not perfect its security
interest in the crops because it filed its financing statement in the county recorder's office.
Id. The JR. Simplot court does not refer to the term "constructive notice" and does not
discuss its legal implications outside of the scope of UCC priority disputes. Id. J.R.
Simplot is only instructive on how to resolve disputes between two equally situated

30

lenders, each with a valid claim for unpaid debt. The "constructive notice" given to
competing lenders in a priority dispute does not defeat either lender's claim for fraud or
breach of contract against the borrower. J.R. Simplot is irrelevant to this appeal.
The Keetches also cite Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, 875 P.2d 570
(Utah 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing v.
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC; 2009 UT 65; 1ffl50-5l, 221 P.3d 234. Maack held
that reasonable reliance in the context of negligent misrepresentation requires the victim
to demonstrate that his reliance on the other party's statement "without some further
inquiry was reasonable under the circumstances." Maack at 577. In Maack, the victim
(Maack) had relied upon a statement that upon purchasing a home, he would obtain the
benefit of a home warranty. Id. at 573-574. During the transaction, Maack did not ask for
details about the warranty, did not review a copy of any warranty, and did not insist that
any of the written documents refer to any home warranty. Id. at 577 Further, because
significant time had elapsed between completion of the home and the sale in question, it
was likely that any home warranty had expired or was close to expiring. Id. at 578.
Finally, Maack was an attorney and new that the written documents stated that the home
was sold "as is". Id. at 575, 577 These documents even stated that there were "no
warranties other than those expressly stated" and that the written documents expressly
disavowed any "prior oral or written agreements." Id.
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The facts of this case are entirely different. The Keetches assured the Timothys
that the horse was not encumbered. To investigate the issue, the Timothys asked the
trainer of the horse who also said he was not aware of any lien on the horse. (T: 380: 816). The Timothys also contacted the AQHA and verified with the AQHA that their
records showed no lien on the horse. Further, the Timothys were not trained in the law
and did know about the UCC filing system and did not know that a lien could be recorded
on a horse in that way. Under these circumstances, it was proper for the court to find that
the Timothys reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation.
The Keetches also cite footnote 9 from Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992). The footnote cites an Oklahoma court for the proposition that in real
estate fraud cases, the victim of the misrepresentation must use reasonable diligence to
uncover the truth. The Maack court points out that Utah has never adopted that standard.
Even if Utah did adopt that standard, it is not helpful in this case because this case is not a
real estate case. Further, the Timothys did use reasonable diligence in attempting to
uncover the truth.
Finally, the Keetches rely on Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah
1996). In Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., the court held that "even if GSI initially
reasonably relied upon the oral promises made at the March 2, 1982 meeting, in light of
the numerous writings denying such a promise, GSI could not have reasonably continued
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to rely upon Getty's alleged promise." Id. at 1068. In other words, when a party makes
an oral misrepresentation but later contradicts that representation in writing delivered to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot be held to have exercised reasonable reliance if the
plaintiff relies upon the oral representation. Id. That did not happen in this case.
Having addressed the Keetches' arguments, the following demonstrates why the
Timothys reasonably relied on a misrepresentation about the encumbered Horse even
without knowing about the UCC and without searching UCC filings.
a. The Timothy's reliance was reasonable without searching UCC filings
The Timothy's reliance on Plaintiffs misrepresentations was reasonable.
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. is instructive. In this case an escrow
company represented that a land development company held an interest in property that it
actually did not have. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302
(Utah 1983). The damaged party sued on the basis that it had received a representation
indicating "that certain properties held in escrow had unencumbered equity values
available as security for the plaintiff." Id. at 303. This was not true because the property
was not owned by the development company. Unknown to the plaintiff, the public
records of the County Recorder's Office showed that the representation was not true. On
appeal, the court found in favor of the plaintiff noting that a defendant who misrepresents
a material fact is liable to the plaintiff for damages unless the Plaintiff did not act
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reasonably by failing to "inspect important documents that y/ertpart of the
transaction...". Id. at 306 (emphasis added). The court differentiated between available
documents that are part of a transaction and documents contained in public records. "[A]
failure to examine public records does not defeat an action for a false representation
because in most cases there is no duty to make such an examination. Thus, it has been
held that in a fraud case a plaintiff who contracts to buy property is under no duty to
examine public records to ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller." Id. at 307
{internal citations omitted) {emphasis added).
This rule is again articulated in Despain v. Despain,%55 P.2d 254 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). In this case, the court found that a trial court's findings were not "clearly
erroneous" when it denied a plaintiffs claim for fraud against her ex-husband. Id. at 257.
The court found that while involved in a divorce proceeding, plaintiff could not rely on
defendant's misrepresentation when she admitted that she did not trust defendant's other
representations, she was represented by an attorney, she intended to inspect a title report
that would have revealed the fraud and she failed to do so. Id. The circumstances made it
apparent that she could not trust the defendant, did not trust defendant, and had the means
and intent to uncover the defendant's fraud. Under those facts, the plaintiffs reliance
was not reasonable.
Borrower cites to Robinson v. Tripco Investments, 2000 UT App. 200, 21 P.3d
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219. In Robinson, the court could not find that Plaintiffs was unreasonable in relying on
defendant's misrepresentation as a matter of law. Id. at f21 (emphasis added; noting that
because it could not find plaintiffs reliance unreasonable as a matter of law, the issue of
reasonable reliance was a factual issue best decided by a trial court), (quoting Robinson v.
Tripco Inv. Inc. 2000 UT App 200, 21 P.3d 219). This case sums up the legal principal in
Despain and Christenson: "[i]n general, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under the
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence,
or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being
deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation." Id. at |20. The
record indicates that the Timothys did not even know anything about UCC filing
statements for horses-much less that a statement had actually been filed. No "facts" or
"circumstances" made the Keetches' deception apparent.
Moreover, the Timothys owned and raised several horses. They were experienced
in raising and selling horses. The Timothy's reliance on the Keetches assertions that the
horses were un-encumbered was reasonable. Notably, even though the District Court
Judge also was unaware of UCC filings for horses, the Keetches still argue that the
Timothys should understand the intricacies of the UCC to a greater extent than the
District Court Judge because Mr. Timothy was a "sophisticated person" in contracts and
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had his "real estate license". Appellants Brief, p. 28. In fact, the evidence did not support
the Keetches' assertion that Mr. Timothy's experience as a real estate agent and his
experience in negotiating contracts would make him aware of the intricacies of UCC
filings for livestock. The Timothys' reliance was reasonable;
II.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TIMOTHYS WERE
CREDIBLE AND THE KEETCHES WERE NOT CREDIBLE BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO DISCREPANCY IN THE TIMOTHYS5 TESTIMONIES.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a) states, in part:
(a)... Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
A court's decision as to the credibility of a witness is not a legal conclusion as

noted in Appellant's brief. Brief of Appellant, p. 3. Rather, "[t]o successfully
demonstrate that a factual finding is clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal all the
evidence in favor of the factual finding and show that, even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court's factual finding, the favorable evidence is insufficient to
support the finding. Moreover, in assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous,
reviewing courts must give 'due regard... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.'" Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ^|27, 54 P.3d 1119; See also
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^|2, 70 P.3d 35 (stating that in a fraud
case, that the reviewing court must allow the trial court's due deference to resolve factual
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disputes and to weigh the credibility of the evidence). The Keetches have failed to
marshal the evidence and the evidence shows that the court did not error.
a. The Keetches Failed to Marshall the Evidence
The Supreme Court recently stated:
To adequately fulfill the marshaling requirement, the appellant must temporarily
assume the role of his adversary, presenting us,"in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists" ...A recital of the trial court's findings with
which the appellant disagrees does not amount to marshaling. Rather, the appellant
must educate the court as to exactly how the trial court arrived at each of the
challenged findings. This requires "a precisely focused summary of all the
evidence supporting the findings," correlated to the location of that evidence in the
record. Failure to provide this summary amounts to an invitation to the appellate
court to invest its time and resources to "go behind the trial court's factual
findings" itself; an invitation which the appellate court may, in its discretion,
refuse.
Friends ofMapleton Mt. Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, 650 Utah Adv. Rep.
28 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court went on to state that an
appellant may not merely allege that the trial court's conclusions were "unhelpful,"
because this would turn the task of "marshaling on its head." Id. citing Jensen v.
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 101, 130 P.3d 325. The court also stated that appellant may not
"reargue the facts." The appellant must "present the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court and not attempt to construe them "in a light most favorable to their case."
Id. Appellate court's don't retry the facts, they review them for "clear error." Id.
The Keetches have argued on appeal that the court cannot find that both Paul and
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Janice Timothy's testimony are credible because of purported discrepancies regarding the
September 28th, 2001 meeting. Appellant's Brief, pg. 30. Paul Timothy testified that
Thomas Keetch told him at the September 28, 2001 meeting that there were no existing
liens on Hesa Son of a Dun. Rebecca Mendenhall testified that she did not recall any
such conversation. To marshal the evidence, the Keetches must point out evidence in a
light favorable to the Timothys. Specifically this evidence includes the following:
Rebecca Mendenhall did not participate in the discussions, but acted as more of a
"scribe." (T:346:14-17). Rebecca Mendenhairs recollection of all of the details of the
meeting was lacking due to the amount of time between the meeting and the trial.
(T:348:4-9). Further, the September 28, 2001 meeting lasted for several hours. (T:355:1314). Most significantly, in paragraph 12 of the court's findings, the court held that
Rebecca Mendenhall's testimony was not credible and the court gave very little weight to
her testimony. (R. 1023). Therefore, when the Keetches argued that Paul Timothy was
not credible because his testimony was contradicted in one aspect by the testimony of
Rebecca Mendenhall, as part of the requirement to marshal the evidence, the Keetches
should have brought up the issues raised by the Timothys in this paragraph.
The Keetches also claim that Paul and Janice Timothy contradicted each other on
the issue of whether a prior lien on Hesa Son of a Dun was discussed at closing. Janice
Timothy's testimony corroborates her husband's when she stated that it was "always
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implied that he (the Horse) was free and clear." (T:280: 11-18). The Keetches ask this
court to infer that Janice Timothy's testimony indicated that the issue was never
discussed. Such an inference would be unfair to make. Paul Timothy testified that he
asked Thomas Keetch about liens. Janice Timothy was asked whether Hesa Son of a Dun
was "free and clear." If Janice Timothy had overhead the conversation about liens, her
testimony that it was "implied that he was free and clear" is entirely consistent. After all,
a lay person might reasonably understand that if a horse does not have a lien on it, the
horse is free and clear. Janice Timothy further testified that "there was never any mention
of him being collateralized" (T:280:17-18). Again, that testimony is consistent with Paul
Timothy's testimony that on September 28, 2001 Thomas Keetch told Paul Timothy that
there were no liens on Hesa Son of a Dun. A further plausible explanation for the Court
to make is that during a two hour meeting, Janice Timothy may have stepped out
momentarily or not been paying close attention.
Even if the Keetches could successfully infer some contradiction in the Timothy's
testimony, their argument would still be baseless. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
findings of the trial court, even if a discrepancy theoretically existed in Janice Timothy's
testimony, it is explained by the fact that she did not remember the facts as clearly as Paul
Timothy. The trial court noted, "[although, the Timothy's memories have faded to some
extent, they are both credible witnesses." (R: 1023). Taking this logic one step further,
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even if her testimony was not credible, Paul Timothy's testimony alone, would lead the
Court to the same conclusion that the Keetches committed fraud. He testified that Teri
Keetch misrepresented facts at McDonald's and that Tom Keetch misrepresented facts at
the closing on September 28th, 2001. The court found Paul Timothy's testimony credible.
To marshal the evidence, the Keetches have an obligation to also cite to the
evidence indicating that Mr. Timothy was credible. For example, Mr. Timothy testified
that Mrs. Keetch had told him she needed exactly $83,500 in order to pay off a loan on
her "brood mares." (T:376:8-21). Mr. Timothy testified that at closing, Thomas Keetch
repeated that they needed exactly $83,500. (T:390:12-15). Because the Timothys had
obtained a second mortgage on their home to loan the money, but the home lender took
out closing costs, the amount they obtained from the home loan was $309 short of the
required $83,500. Therefore, Paul Timothy wrote a separate $309 check to make the total
of $83,500. Mr. Timothy's testimony is corroborated by exhibits 7 and 8 which are the
two checks totaling $83,500. See Addendum, Exh. "G" and "H". Because exhibits 7 and
8 bolster Mr. Timothy's credibility, the Keetches should have marshaled that evidence.
Additional evidence that the Keetches should have marshaled was the testimony of
Rebecca Mendenhall. Rebecda Mendenhall brokered the loan at issue in this case.
Rebecca Mendenhall testified that Teri Keetch told her she needed a loan for $83,500 in
order to pay off a herd of horses. (T:3232:24-324:16, 333:8-15). Both Mr. and Mrs.
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Keetch said that it was critical that they get at least $83,500 and they needed it no later
than 24 hours after the closing date in order to save the herd. (T:341:2-25) Rebecca
Mendenhall also testified that Teri Keetch told Rebecca that Teri Keetch was willing to
use a horse that she owned, a horse named Hesa Son of a Dun, valued at $125,000 to
$150,000 as collateral on the loan with the Timothys. Teri Keetch never told Rebecca
Mendenhall that there was a lien on the horse. (T:327:4-327:24, 333:4-7). Rebecca
Mendenhall also testified that neither Thomas Keetch nor Teri Keetch ever mentioned
any bankruptcy until after the loan closing. (T:332:25-333:3). After the Timothy loan
closed and the prior lender seized Hesa Son of a Dun, Teri Keetch called Rebecca
Mendenhall and admitted that she was in bankruptcy and that Hesa Son of a Dun was
subject to a prior lien secured before closing. Rebecca Mendenhall confronted Mrs.
Keetch in regards to why that information had not been disclosed to herself and the
Timothys prior to the Timothy loan closing. Mrs. Keetch did not say why she withheld
that information. (T:336:14-338:2). This testimony corroborates the testimony of Paul
Timothy and should have been cited by the Keetches as part of their requirement to
marshal the evidence.
The Keetches argument really goes beyond the credibility of Mr. Timothy. Their
argument is that the evidence does not support the finding of fraud. In fact, the evidence
is overwhelming.
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Thomas Keetch misrepresented, could not remember, or did not know how he used
$83,500.00 in loan proceeds. He misrepresented to whom and how much he paid these
proceeds and misrepresented what they were used for. His testimony contradicted itself
frequently and differed from his deposition. He misrepresented how much he had paid in
restitution after entering into a plea in abeyance for criminal charges arising out of the
same incident. He misrepresented information on his bankruptcy petition. He
misrepresented his involvement and misrepresented details about the horse lien and his
bankruptcy.
Teri Keetch misrepresented her involvement in her bankruptcy proceeding and
even gave testimony contradictory to her sworn statement made in bankruptcy court. She
misrepresented the prior encumbrance on Hesa Son of a Dun. She lied about the intended
use of the loan and contradicted herself at trial about her intended uses of the loan. She
then admitted that she had misled Paul Timothy at their meeting in McDonald's. She then
contradicted her husband, co-defendant Thomas Keetch, regarding whether she signed
loan documents. She then contradicted her own deposition testimony regarding her
signature on the loan documents. She then misrepresented how much of the loan proceeds
she had paid directly to her Mom. She lied about her involvement with the Keetch ranch
and her testimony contradicted her own testimony and that of her own brother. Her
testimony differed from that of Jake Stephens regarding the seizure of the horse. Jake
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Stephens is a disinterested third party, who had no motivation to lie. Jake Stephens then
informed the court that Teri Keetch had a reputation in the community for being a
habitual liar. Teri Keetch's own brother informed the court the Teri had lied during her
own deposition. Teri Keetch admitted that she never told Paul or Janice Timothy that
Hesa Son of a Dun was already encumbered because she thought Rebecca Mendenhall
would tell them.
III.

THE KEETCHES HAVE NOT BRIEFED THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS
FEES.
The Keetches' brief notes attorneys fees in its issues and standard of review, but

this issue remains un-briefed. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24, the
Appellant must identify the issues for review. Borrowers' have failed to brief the issue of
attorney's fees. The Utah supreme court has stated:
..petitioners seeking judicial review must identify the legal or factual errors of the
lower court or agency. We have consistently declined to review issues that are not
adequately briefed. And we have long held that it is improper to "mak[e] blanket
assertions and leav[e] the responsibility to the court to ferret out evidence from the
record to support [them]." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (In re. Questar Gas Co.) 2007
UT79, 175P.3d545.

The Keetches have not made an assertion of legal or factual error. The lone
citation to authority is the same case cited by the trial court when it found in favor of the
Timothys. See Kealarnakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13. The
Timothys are unable to address this issue because the Keetches have failed to make any
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factual or legal arguments to show that the trial court erred. In order to make an
argument, the Timothys would be forced to guess what arguments the Keetches might
have made. Because the award of attorneys fees was supported by the evidence and the
law, the Timothys cannot guess what the Keetches intended to argue. This court should
not hear any arguments on this issue.
IV.

THE TIMOTHYS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES
INCURRED IN CHALLENGING THIS APPEAL,
The Timothys seek their attorneys fees incurred for this appeal. Under R. 24(a)(9)

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party seeking attorneys' fees incurred on
appeal must make a specific request and state the legal basis for an award of attorneys'
fees. Under R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook attorneys may collect their attorneys fees on appeal
on the same basis as they were awarded in the trial court, R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002
UT 11, Tf27, 40 P.3d 1119 (awarding fees on appeal for a breach of contract action).
Attorneys fees may also be awarded in equity in a case involving fraud. Doctors' Co. v.
Drezga, 2009 UT 60, |32, 218 P.3d 598. In this case, the Timothys prevailed in their
breach of contract and fraud actions and the trial court awarded attorneys fees-assessing
that the damages for fraud were identical to breach of contract. (R. 1011). On appeal, The
Timothys' attorneys fees have increased. Since the Timothys have established that the
trial court did not err, they are entitled to collect additional fees incurred on appeal. This
court should remand this case with a specific order to the trial court to receive evidence
44

and make a finding and award attorneys fees incurred on appeal.
V.

THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE ANY ERRORS ARE
HARMLESS.
The Keetches challenge the judgment because they claim no fraud occurred. Even

if that were true, the judgment would still stand in the same amount because the
Keeetches breached their contract with the Timothys. The Keetches have made no
argument on appeal regarding the trial court's finding of breach of contract. The trial
court stated that under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, R. 61, a judgment should not be
disturbed for harmless error. The rule states:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. Utah R. Civ. P. R. 61.
The trial court found in favor of the Timothys on the independent grounds of
breach of contract and fraud. The measure of damages were the same for each cause of
action. (R. 1013-1017). The Keetches do not claim that the court erred in finding breach
of contract and awarding damages for this breach. When the outcome of the case is not
affected, the appellate court should find any error harmless. Armed Forces Ins. Exck v.
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^ 22, 70 P.3d 35. The court stated, "[i]f the error was harmless,
that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
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that it affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Id. See also State
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121, fn. 10. (Utah 1989) (discussing and classifying various types
of eiTor). Utah appellate court have also described harmless error as an error that affects
the "substantial rights'5 of the parties where the outcome of the case would be affected
minus the error. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796-797 (Utah 1991); See
also ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 256 (Utah Ct App. 1997).
The Keetches may argue that an error on the issue of fraud is not harmless because
it impacts whether the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. This is not the case. Under
11 U.S.C. 523(a) "[a] discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b), or 1328 (b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" when the debt was for
"money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the
extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;" 11 U.S.C. 523(a) 2
(A). Under the previous version of the bankruptcy code, Utah courts have recognized that
bankruptcy law does not discharge debts obtained by false pretenses. See e.g. Gear v.
Davis, 435 P.2d 923 (Utah 1966)(holding that a debt secured by false pretenses or false
oral representations was not discharged). A debt for money obtained under a simple
contract action is dischargeable without a showing of fraud or false pretenses. Jensen v.
Barrick, 391 P.2d 429 (Utah 1964). However, debt secured by a contract that was
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obtained by fraud or false pretenses is not dischargeable in bankruptcy even if the
plaintiff sued under a breach of contract theory rather than common law fraud:
We believe that a loan, evidenced by a promissory note, which is obtained by fraud
is excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy. This being so, the plaintiff here could
maintain its action on the note and was not confined to an action based upon fraud.
National Fin, Co. v. Valdez, 359 P.2d 9, 9 (Utah 1961).
Federal bankruptcy courts agree with this position. In re. Schnuelle v. Schnuelle,
Nos. Bk07-42289-TJM, A08-4014-TJM, (U.S. Bankruptcy, Dist. Neb. 2010). In In re.
Schnuelle a farmer obtained financing secured by his crops. He misrepresented data on
his balance sheets and fed the secured crops to his cattle. The court then defined fraud
and false pretenses in this context. False pretenses are misrepresentations or "any other
conduct that amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the truth." Id. Like the
famer in In re. Schnuelle v. Schnuelle, this definition is broad enough to encompass the
Timothys' claim for breach of contract when the Keetches' loan was obtained by "false
pretenses" and the Keetches' false statements. (R. 1009). Therefore, 11 U.S.C. 523(a) 2
(A) applies.
In this appeal, the Keetches do not dispute the findings of misrepresentation or
false pretenses. Instead the Keetches dispute one element of fraud, ie. reasonable
reliance. Even if this court were to find that the element of reasonable reliance was not
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met, the Keetches debt will not be discharged because the debt was made under false
pretenses. Any error made in regards to the Timothys' action for fraud is harmless.

CONCLUSION
The Keetches are not entitled to relief because the trial court did not err when it
found that the Timothys reasonably relied on the Keetches' misrepresentation. The
Timothys' reliance was reasonable even though they did not search UCC filings. There is
no duty to search public records to show that a plaintiffs reliance is reasonable when that
plaintiff alleges fraud. The Keetches have failed to marshal the evidence to show that the
court erred in finding the Keetches' testimony unreliable and the Timothys' testimony
reliable. Finally, the Keetches have not briefed the issue of attorneys fees. The Timothys
are entitled to their reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal, and any error made by
the trial court is harmless.

Dated this

_ day of May, 2010.
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Nelson Abbott,
Attorney for Appellee, Paul and Janice Timothy
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit "A"
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 52(a):
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on
more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce,
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
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(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the
transcript of an audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to
whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may
move to correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of
the hearing isfiled,unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or
disagreement shall be resolved by the court and the record made to accurately reflect the
proceeding.

Exhibit "B
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, R. 24(b)(1):
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
1. (a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page
which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where
they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees

incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such
an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion;
in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or
the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if
the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of
the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant"
and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right

corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to withiii the deposition or
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified,
offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed
50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules,
regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall
exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present
the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of
CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to
the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for
good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the
limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the
number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer
additional pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than
seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall
be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be
destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant qr appellee may adopt by

reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come
to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter
setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days
of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings andfreefromburdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer.

Exhibit "C
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 61:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Exhibit "D

other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition,
United States Statutes
(B)
Title 11. Bankruptcy
use of a statement in writingChapter 5. CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE
ESTATE

0)

Subchapter II. DEBTORS DUTIES AND BENEFITS

that is materially false,

CutientthoughPL

(«)

111 126

§ 523.Exceptions to Discharge

respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition,

(a)

(Ml)

A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228 (a), 1228 (b),
or 1328 (b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-

on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for
such money, property, services, or credit reasonably
relied, and

(i)

(iv)

for a tax or a customs duty-

that the debtor caused to be made or published with
intent to deceive, or

(A)
(C)
of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507
(a)(3) or 507 (a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for
such tax was filed or allowed,

(1)

for purposes of subparagraph (A)~
(B)
(I)
with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or
notice, if required-

(>)
was not filed or given, or

consumer debts owed to a single creditor and
aggregating more than $500 for luxury goods or services
incurred by an individual debtor on or within 90 days
before the order for relief under this title are presumed to
be nondischargeable, and

do

(ID

was filed or given after the date on which such return,
report, or notice was last due, under applicable law or
under any extension, and after two years before the date
of the filing of the petition, or

cash advances aggregating more than $750 that are
extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit
plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 70
days before the order for relief under this title, are
presumed to be nondischargeable, and

(Q
with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return
or willfully attempted m any manner to evade or defeat
such tax,

(ii)

for purposes of tins subparagraph—

a)
(2)
for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal,
or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-

the terms consumer', credit', and open end credit plan'
have the same meanings as in section 103 of the Truth in
Lending Act, and

(A)

(II)

false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,

the term "luxury goods or services" does not include

goods or services reasonably necessary foi the support or
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor

(A)

0)
(3)
neither listed nor scheduled under section 521 (1) of this
title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the
creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit-

an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured, oi guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made
under any program funded m whole or in part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or

(A)

(u)

if such debt is not of a kind specified m paragraph (2),
(4), or (6) of tins subsection, timely filing of a proof of
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing, or

an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship, or stipend, or

(B)

any other educational loan that is a qualified education
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an
individual,

if such debt is of a kind specified m paragraph (2), (4), or
(6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim
and timely request for a determination of dischargeability
of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in
tune for such timely filing and request,
(4)
for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny,

(B)

(9)
for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such
operation was unlawful because the debtor was
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another
substance,
(10)

(5)
for a domestic support obligation,
(6)
for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity or to the property of another entity,
(7)
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and
is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than
a tax penalty(A)
relating to a tax of a kind not specified m paragraph (1)
of this subsection, or
(B)
imposed with respect to a transaction or event that
occurred before three years before the date of the filing of
the petition,
(8)
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor's dependents, for—

that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the
debtor in a prior case concerning the debtor under this
title or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor
waived discharge, or was denied a discharge under
section 727 (a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or
under section 14c(l), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act,

(ID
provided m any final judgment, unreviewable order, or
consent order or decree entered in any court of the United
States or of any State, issued by a Federal depository
institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any
settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, arising
from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity committed with respect to any
depository institution or insured credit union,
(12)
for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any
commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository
institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of
an insured depository institution, except that this
paragraph shall not extend any such commitment which
would otherwise be terminated due to any act of such
agency,
(13)
for any payment of an order of restitution issued under

title 18, United States Code,

(A)

(14)
incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would be
nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1),

a loan permitted under section 408(b)(1) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or
subject to section 72(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, or

(14A)

(B)

incurred to pay a tax to a governmental unit, other than
the United States, that would be nondischargeable under
paragraph (1),

a loan from a thrift savings plan permitted under
subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, that satisfies the
requirements of section 8433(g) of such title,

(14B)

but nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide
that any loan made under a governmental plan under
section 414(d), or a contract or account undei section
403(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 constitutes
a claim or a debt under this title, or

incurred to pay fines or penalties imposed under Federal
election law,
(15)
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not
of the kind described m paragraph (5) that is incurred by
the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or m
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
oi other order of a court of record or, a determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental umt,

(19)
that(A)
is for-

(0
(16)
for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable
after the order for relief to a membership association with
respect to the debtor's interest m a umt that has
condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative
corporation, or a lot in a homeowners association, for as
long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or
possessory ownership interest m such unit, such
corporation, or such lot, but nothing m this paragraph
shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor for a
membership association fee or assessment for a period
ansmg before entry of the order for relief m a pending or
subsequent bankruptcy case,
(17)
for a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the
filing of a case, motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other
costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing,
regardless of an assertion of poverty by the debtor under
subsection (b) or (f)(2) of section 1915 of title 28 (or a
similar non-Federal law), or the debtor's status as a
prisoner, as defined in section 1915 (h) of title 28 (or a
similar non-Federal law),

the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that
term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws,
or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or
State securities laws, or

(")
common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security, and
(B)
results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition
was filed, from-

(0
any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered m
any Federal or State judicial or administrative
proceeding,

(«)
any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor, or

(18)

(in)

owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other
plan established under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414,
457, or 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
under-

any court or administrative order for any damages, fine,
penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement
payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by
the debtor
For purposes of this subsection, the term " return' means a

return that satisfies the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing
requirements) Such term includes a return prepared
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written
stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a
nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return
made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law
(b)
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt
that was excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(1),
(a)(3), or (a)(8) of this section, under section 17a(l),
17a(3), or 17a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, under section
439A [1] of the Higher Education Act of 1965, or under
section 733(g) [1] of the Public Health Service Act in a
prior case concerning the debtor under this title, or under
the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a case under this
title unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section,
such debt is not dischargeable in the case under this title
(c)

award such costs and fees if special circumstances would
make the award unjus^
(e)
Any institution-affiliated party of an insured depository
institution shall be considered to be acting m a fiduciary
capacity with respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4)
or(ll)
[1] See References in Text note below
History. Amended by Pub L 109-8, §314(a), 119 Stat
88, eff 4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §310, 119 Stat 84, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §301, 119 Stat 75, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §224(c), 119 Stat 64, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §220, 119 Stat 59, eff
4/20/2005

(1)
Except as provided m subsection (a)(3)(B) of this
section, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a
kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection
(a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to
whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing,
the court determines such debt to be excepted from
discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may
be, of subsection (a) of tins section
(2)
Paragraph (1) shall not apply m the case of a Federal
depository institutions regulatory agency seeking, in its
capacity as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for
an insured depository institution, to recover a debt
described m subsection (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or(a)(ll)
owed to such institution by an institution-affiliated party
unless the receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent was
appointed in time to reasonably comply, or for a Federal
depository institutions regulatory agency acting m its
corporate capacity as a successor to such receiver,
conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably comply,
with subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such
institution-affiliated party with respect to such debt

Amended by Pub L 109-8, §215, 119 Stat 54, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §714, 119 Stat 128, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §412, 119 Stat 107, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, § 1502(a)(2), 119 Stat 216,
eff 4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, § 1404(a), 119 Stat 215, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §1235, 119 Stat 204, eff
4/20/2005
Amended by Pub L 109-8, §1209, 119 Stat 194, eff
4/20/2005
Related Legislative Provision: See Pub
§ 1404(b), 119 Stat 21$

L
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(d)
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability
of a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this
section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall grant
judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a
reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding if the court
finds that the position of the creditor was not
substantially justified, except that the court shall not

Source
(Pub L 95-598, Nov 6,1978, 92 Stat 2590, Pub L
96-56, § 3, Aug 14, 1979, 93 Stat 387, Pub L 97-35,
title XXIII, § 2334(b), Aug 13, 1981, 95 Stat 863, Pub
L 98-353, title III, §§ 307, 371, 454, July 10, 1984, 98
Stat 353, 364, 375, Pub L 99-554, title II, §§ 257(n),
281,283(j), Oct 27, 1986, 100 Stat 3115-3117, Pub L

101-581, §2(a), Nov 15, 1990, 104 Stat 2865, Pub L
101-647, title XXV, §2522(a), title XXXI, § 3102(a),
title XXXVI, § 3621, Nov 29, 1990, 104 Stat 4865,
4916, 4964, Pub L 103-322, title XXXII, §320934,
Sept 13, 1994, 108 Stat 2135, Pub L 103-394, title II,
§221, title III, §§304(e), (h)(3), 306, 309, title V,
§501(d)(13), Oct 22,1994, 108 Stat 4129, 4133-4135,
4137,4145, Pub L 104-134, title I, §101 [(a)] [title VIII,
§ 804(b)], Apr 26, 1996, 110 Stat 1321, 1321-74,
renumbered title I, Pub L 104-140, §l(a),May 2, 1996,
110 Stat 1327, Pub L 104-193, title III, §374(a), Aug
22, 1996, 110 Stat 2255, Pub L 105-244, title IX,
§971(a),Oct 7,1998, 112 Stat 1837, Pub L 107-204,
title VIII, §803, July 30,2002, 116 Stat 801, Pub L
109-8, title II, §§215, 220, 224 (c), title III, §§301, 310,
314 (a), title IV, §412, title VII, §714, title XII, §§1209,
1235, title XIV, § 1404(a), title XV, § 1502(a)(2), Apr 20,
2005,119 Stat 54, 59, 64, 75, 84, SS, 107, 128, 194, 204,
215,216)
Historical and Revision Notes
legislative statements
Section 523 (a)(1) represents a compromise between the
position taken in the House bill and the Senate
amendment Section 523 (a)(2) likewise represents a
compromise between the position taken in the House bill
and the Senate amendment with respect to the false
financial statement exception to discharge In order to
clarify that a "renewal of credit" includes a "refinancing
of credit", explicit reference to a refinancing of credit is
made m the preamble to section 523 (a)(2) A renewal of
credit or refinancing of credit that was obtained by a false
financial statement within the terms of section 523 (a)(2)
is nondischargeable However, each of the provisions of
section 523 (a)(2) must be proved Thus, under section
523 (a)(2)(A) a creditor must prove that the debt was
obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition Subparagraph
(A) is intended to codify current case law e g , Neal v
Clark, 95 U S 704 (1887) [24 L Ed 586], which
interprets "fraud" to mean actual or positive fraud rather
than fraud implied in law Subparagraph (A) is mutually
exclusive from subparagraph (B) Subparagraph (B)
pertains to the so-called false financial statement In order
for the debt to be nondischargeable, the creditor must
prove that the debt was obtained by the use of a statement
m writing (l) that is materially false, (n) respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition, (in) on which
the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied,
(IV) that the debtor caused to be made or published with
intent to deceive Section 523 (a)(2)(B)(iv) is not
intended to change from present law since the statement
that the debtor causes to be made or published with the
intent to deceive automatically includes a statement that
the debtor actually makes or publishes with an intent to
deceive Section 523 (a)(2)(B) is explained m the House

report Under section 523 (a)(2)(B)(i) a discharge is
barred only as to that portion of a loan with respect to
which a false financial statement is materially false
In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to
refinance existing credit on which there has been no
default If the creditor does not forfeit remedies or
otherwise rely to his detriment on a false financial
statement with respect to existing credit, then an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of such credit is
nondischargeable only to the extent of the new money
advanced, on the other hand, if an existing loan is m
default or the creditor otherwise reasonably relies to his
detriment on a false financial statement with regard to an
existing loan, then the entire debt is nondischargeable
under section 523 (a)(2)(B) This codifies the reasomng
expressed by the second circuit m In re Danns, 558 F 2d
114(2dCir 1977)
Section 523(a)(3) of the House amendment is derived
from the Senate amendment The provision is intended to
overrule Birkett v Columbia Bank, 195 U S 345 (1904)
[25 SCt 38,49 L Ed 231,12 AmBankrRep 691]
Section 523(a)(4) of the House amendment represents a
compromise between the House bill and the Senate
amendment
Section 523 (a)(5) is a compromise between the House
bill and the Senate amendment The provision excepts
from discharge a debt owed to a spouse, former spouse or
child of the debtor, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
agreement, for alimony to, mamtenance for, or support of
such spouse or child but not to the extent that the debt is
assigned to another entity If the debtor has assumed an
obligation of the debtor's spouse to a third party m
connection with a separation agreement, property
settlement agreement, or divorce proceeding, such debt is
dischargeable to the extent that payment of the debt by
the debtor is not actually in the nature ol alimony,
maintenance, or support of debtor's spouse, former
spouse, or child
Section 523 (a)(6) adopts the position taken m the House
bill and rejects the alternative suggested m the Senate
amendment The phrase "willful and malicious injury"
covers a willful and malicious conversion
Section 523(a)(7) of the House amendment adopts the
position taken in the Senate amendment and rejects the
position taken in the House bill A penalty relating to a
tax cannot be nondischargeable unless the tax itself is
nondischargeable
Section 523 (a)(8) represents a compromise between the
House bill and the Senate amendment regarding
educational loans Tins provision is broader lhan current
law which is limited to federally insured loans Only
educational loans owing to a governmental umt or a
nonprofit institution of higher education are made

nondischargeable under this paragraph
Section 523 (b) is new The section represents a
modification of similar provisions contained in the House
bill and the Senate amendment
Section 523(c) of the House amendment
position taken in the Senate amendment

adopts the

Section 523 (d) represents a compromise between the
position taken in the House bill and the Senate
amendment on the issue of attorneys' fees m false
financial
statement
complaints
to
determine
dischargeability The provision contained m the House
bill permitting the court to award damages is eliminated
The court must grant the debtor judgment or a reasonable
attorneys' fee unless the granting of judgment would be
clearly inequitable
Nondischargeable debts The House amendment retains
the basic categories of nondischargeable tax liabilities
contained in both bills, but restricts the time limits on
certain nondischargeable taxes Under the amendment,
nondischargeable taxes cover taxes entitled to priority
under section 507(a)(6) of title 11 and, in the case of
individual debtors under chapters 7, 11, or 13, tax
liabilities with respect to which no required return had
been filed or as to which a late return had been filed if the
return became last due, including extensions, within 2
years before the date of the petition or became due after
the petition or as to which the debtor made a fraudulent
return, entry or invoice or fraudulently attempted to
evade or defeat the tax
In the case of individuals in liquidation under chapter 7 or
in reorganization under chapter 11 of title 11, section
1141 (d)(2) incorporates by reference the exceptions to
discharge continued m section 523 Different rules
concerning the discharge of taxes where a partnership or
corporation reorganizes under chapter 11, apply under
section 1141
The House amendment also deletes the reduction rule
contained in section 523(e) of the Senate amendment
Under that rule, the amount of an otherwise
nondischargeable tax liability would be reduced by the
amount which a governmental tax authority could have
collected from the debtor's estate if it had filed a timely
claim against the estate but which it did not collect
because no such claim was filed Tins provision is deleted
in order not to effectively compel a tax authority to file
claim against the estate m "no asset" cases, along with a
dischargeability petition In no-asset cases, therefore, if
the tax authority is not potentially penalized by failing to
file a claim, the debtor in such cases will have a better
opportunity to choose the prepayment forum, bankruptcy
court or the Tax Court, m which to litigate Ins personal
liability for a nondischargeable tax
The House amendment also adopts the Senate
amendment provision limiting the nondischargeabihty of

punitive tax penalties, that is, penalties other than those
which represent collection of a principal amount of tax
liability through the foftn of a "penalty " Under the House
amendment, tax penalties which are basically punitive in
nature are to be nondischargeable only if the penalty is
computed by reference to a related tax liability winch is
nondischargeable or, if the amount of the penalty is not
computed by reference to a tax liability, the transaction or
event giving rise to the penalty occurred during the
3-year penod ending on the date of the petition
senate report no. 95-989
This section specifies which of the debtor's debts are not
discharged in a bankruptcy case, and certain procedures
for effectuating the section The provision m Bankruptcy
Act § 17c [section 35(c) of former title 11] granting the
bankruptcy
courts
jurisdiction
to
determine
dischargeability is deleted as unnecessary, in view of the
comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in
proposed 28 U S C 1334 (b), which is adequate to cover
the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today
over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy
Act § 17c The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will
specify, as they do today, who may request
determinations of dischargeability, subject, of course, to
proposed 11 U S C 523 (c) , and when such a request
may be made Proposed 1 1 U S C 350,providing for
reopening of cases, provides one possible procedure for a
determination of dischargeability and related issues after
a case is closed
Subsection (a) lists nine kinds of debts excepted from
discharge Taxes that are excepted from discharge are set
forth m paragraph (1) These include claims against the
debtor which receive priority m the second, third and
sixth categories (§ 507(a)(3)(B) and (c) and (6)) These
categories include taxes for which the tax authority failed
to file a claim against the estate or filed its claim late
Whether or not the taxing authority's claim is secured will
also not affect the claim's nondischargeabihty if the tax
liability in question is otherwise entitled to priority
Also included m the nondischargeable debts are taxes for
which the debtor had not filed a required return as of the
petition date, or for which a return had been filed beyond
its last permitted due date (§ 523(a)(1)(B)) For tins
purpose, the date of the tax yeai to which the return
relates is immaterial The late return rule applies,
however, only to the late returns filed within three years
before the petition was filed, and to late returns filed after
the petition m title 11 was filed For this purpose, the
taxable year in question need not be one or more of the
three years immediately preceding the filing of the
petition
Tax claims with respect to which the debtor filed a
fraudulent return, entry or invoice, or fraudulently
attempted to evade or defeat any tax (§ 523(a)(1)(C)) are
included The date of the taxable year with regard to

which the fraud occurred is immatenal
Also included are tax payments due under an agreement
for deferred payment of taxes, which a debtor had entered
into with the Internal Revenue Service (or State or local
tax authority) before the filing of the petition and which
relate to aprepetition tax liability (§ 523(a)(1)(D)) are
also nondischargeable This classification applies only to
tax claims winch would have received priority under
section 507 (a) if the taxpayer had filed a title 11 petition
on the date on which the deferred payment agreement
was entered into This rule also applies only to
installment payments which become due dunng and after
the commencement of the title 11 case Payments winch
had become due withm one year before the filing of the
petition receive sixth priority, and will be
nondischargeable under the general rule of section 523
(a)(1)(A)
The above categories ofnondischargeabihty
customs duties as well as to taxes

apply to

Paragraph (2) provides that as under Bankruptcy Act §
17a(2) [section 35(a)(2) of fonner title 11], a debt for
obtaining money, property, services, or a refinancing
extension or renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, or by use of a statement m
writing respecting the debtor's financial condition that is
materially false, on which the creditor reasonably relied,
and which the debtor made or published with intent to
deceive, is excepted from discharge Tins provision is
modified only slightly from current section 17a (2) First,
"actual fraud" is added as a ground for exception from
discharge Second, the creditor must not only have relied
on a false statement in writing, but the reliance must have
been reasonable This codifies case law construing
present section 17a (2) Third, the phrase "m any manner
whatsoever" that appears in current law after "made or
published" is deleted as unnecessary, the word
"published" is used in the same sense that it is used m
defamation cases
Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under
paragraph (3) The provision, derived from section 17a
(3) [section 35(a)(3) of fonner title 11], follows current
law, butclanfies some uncertainties generated by the
case law construing 17a(3) The debt is excepted from
discharge if it was not scheduled m time to permit timely
action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case

Colwell, 139 U S 473 (1902), held that a less stnct
standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases
have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disiegard"
standard, they are overruled
Paragraph (6) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse,
fonner spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of the spouse or child This
language, m combination with the repeal of section
456(b) of the Social Secunty Act (42 U S C 656 (b)) by
section 326 of the bill, will apply to make
nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support
owed directly to a spouse or dependent What constitutes
alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined
under the bankruptcy law, not State law Thus, cases such
as In re Waller, 494 F2d 447 (6th Cir 1974), are
overruled, and the result m cases such as Fife \ Fife, 1
Utah 2d 281, 265 P 2d 642 (1952) is followed The
proviso, however, makes nondischargeable any debts
resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the
debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that
the agreement is m payment of alimony, maintenance, or
support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy
law consideiations as to whether a particular agreement
to pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a
property settlement
Paragraph (7) makes nondischargeable certain liabilities
for penalties including tax penalties if the underlying tax
with respect to which the penalty was imposed is also
nondischargeable (sec 523 (a)(7)) These latter liabilities
cover those which, but are penal in nature, as distinct
from so-called "pecuniary loss" penalties which, in the
case of taxes, involve basically the collection of a tax
under the label of a "penalty " This provision differs from
the bill as introduced, which did not link the
nondischarge of a tax penalty with the treatment of the
underlying tax The amended provision reflects the
existing position of the Internal Revenue Service as to tax
penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue Code
(RevRul 68-574, 1968-2 C B 595)
Paragraph (8) follows generally current law and excerpts
from discharge student loans until such loans have been
due and owing for five years Such loans include direct
student loans as well as insured and guaranteed loans
This provision is intended to be self-executing and the
lender or institution is not required to file a complaint to
detennine the nondischargeabihty of any student loan

Paragraph (4) excepts debts for fraud mcwred by the
debtor while actmg m a fiduciary capacity or for
defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropnation

Paragraph (9) excepts from discharge debts that the
debtor owed before a previous bankniptcy case
concerning the debtor in winch the debtor w as denied a
discharge other than on the basis of the six-year bar

Paragraph (5) provides that debts for willful and
malicious conversion or injury by the debtor to another
entity or the property of another entity are
nondischargeable Under this paragraph "willful" means
deliberate or intentional To the extent that Tinker v

Subsection (b) of this section pennits discharge in a
bankruptcy case of an unscheduled debt fiom a pnor
case This provision is earned over from Bankruptcy Act
§ 17b [section 35(b) of fonner title 11] The result
dictated by the subsection would probably not be

different if the subsection were not included
included nevertheless for clarity

It is

Subsection (c) requires a creditor who is owed a debt that
may be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4),
or (5), (false statements, defalcation or larceny
misappropriation, or willful and malicious injury) to
initiate proceedings m the bankruptcy court for an
exception to discharge If the creditor does not act, the
debt is discharged This provision does not change
current law
Subsection (d) is new It provides protection to a
consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who
sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on the
ground of falsity in the incurring of the debt The debtor
may be awarded costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for
the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt
under subsection (a)(2), if the court finds that the
proceeding was frivolous or not brought by its creditor in
good faith
The purpose of the provision is to discourage creditois
from initiating proceedings to obtaining a false financial
statement exception to discharge in the hope of obtaining
a settlement from an honest debtor anxious to save
attorney's fees Such practices impair the debtor's fresh
start and are contrary to the spirit of the bankruptcy laws
house report no. 95-595
Subsection (a) lists eight kinds of debts excepted from
discharge Taxes that are entitled to priority are excepted
from discharge under paragraph (1) In addition, taxes
with lespect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return
or willfully attempted to evade or defeat, or with respect
to which a return (if required) was not filed or was not
filed after the due date and after one year before the
bankruptcy case are excepted from discharge If the
taxing authority's claim has been disallowed, then it
would be barred by the more modem rules of collateral
estoppel from reasserting that claim against the debtor
after the case was closed See Plumb, The Tax
Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws Tax Procedures, 88 HarvLRev 1360, 1388
(1975)
Asunder Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2) [section 35(a)(2) of
former title 11], debt for obtaining money, property,
services, or an extension or renewal of credit by false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, or by use
of a statement m writing respecting the debtor's financial
condition that is materially false, on winch the creditor
reasonably relied, and that the debtor made or published
with mtent to deceive, is excepted from discharge Tins
provision is modified only slightly from current section
17a (2) First, "actual fraud" is added as a grounds for
exception from discharge Second, the creditor must not
only have relied on a false statement in writing, the
reliance must have been reasonable This codifies case

law construing this provision Third, the phrase "in any
manner whatsoever" that appears in current law after
"made or published" is deleted as unnecessary The word
"published" is used in the same sense that it is used m
slander actions
Unscheduled debts are excepted from discharge under
paragraph (3) The provision, denved from section 17a
(3) [section 35(a)(3) of former title 11], follows current
law, but clarifies some uncertainties generated by the
case law construing 17a(3) The debt is excepted from
discharge if it was not scheduled m time to permit timely
action by the creditor to protect his rights, unless the
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case
Paragraph (4) excepts debts for embezzlement or larceny
The deletion of willful and malicious conversion from §
17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act [section 35(a)(2) of former
title 11 ] is not intended to effect a substantive change
The intent is to include in the category of
non-dischargeable debts a conversion under which the
debtor willfully and maliciously intends to borrow
property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict
injury but on which injury is in fact inflicted
Paragraph (5) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or child This
language, in combination with the repeal of section
456(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U S C 656 (b)) by
section 327 of the bill, will apply to make
nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support
owed directly to a spouse or dependent See Hearings, pt
2, at 942 What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or
support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws,
not State law Thus, cases such as In re Waller, 494 F 2d
447 (6th Cir 1974), Hearings, pt 3, at 1308-10, are
overruled, and the result in cases such as Fife v Fife, 1
Utah 2d 281, 265 P 2d 642 (1952) is followed This
provision will, however, make nondischargeable any
debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold
the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent
that the agreement is in payment of alimony,
maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined
under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to
considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay
money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property
settlement See Hearings, pt 3, at 1287-1290
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another person or to the property
of another person Under this paragraph, "willful" means
deliberate or intentional To the extent that Tinker v
Colwell, 193 U S 473(1902) [24SCt 505,48 LEd
754, 11 Am Bankr Rep 568], held that a looser standard
is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied
on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard" standard, they
are overruled
Paragraph (7) excepts from discharge a debt for a fine,

penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, that is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss
Paragraph (8) [enacted as (9)] excepts from discharge
debts that the debtor owed before a previous bankruptcy
case concerning the debtor in which the debtor was
demed a discharge other than on the basis of the six-year
bar
Subsection (d) is new It provides protection to a
consumer debtor that dealt honestly with a creditor who
sought to have a debt excepted from discharge on
grounds of falsity in the incurring of the debt The debtor
is entitled to costs of and a reasonable attorney's fee for
the proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt
under subsection (a)(2), if the creditor initiated the
proceeding and the debt was determined to be
dischargeable The court is permitted to award any actual
pecuniary loss that the debtor may have suffered as a
result of the proceeding (such as loss of a day's pay) The
purpose of the provision is to discourage creditors from
initiating false financial statement exception to discharge
actions in the hopes of obtaimng a settlement from an
honest debtor anxious to save attorney's fees Such
practices impair the debtor's fresh start
References in Text
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in
subsec (a), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal
Revenue Code
Section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act, referred to in
subsec (a)(2)(C)(n)(I), is classified to section 1602 of
Title 15, Commerce and Trade
The Bankruptcy Act, referred to msubsecs (a)(10) and
(b), is act July 1, 1898, ch 541, 30 Stat 544, as amended,
which was classified generally to former Title 11
Sections 14c and 17a of the Bankruptcy Act were
classified to sections 32(c) and 35(a) of former Title 11
Section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec (a)(18)(A), is
classified to section 1108 (b)(1) of Title 29, Labor
Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
referred to m subsec (a)(19)(A)(i), is classified to section
78c (a)(47) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade
Section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965,
referred to m subsec (b), was classified to section 1087-3
of Title 20, Education, and was repealed by Pub L
95-598, title III, § 317, Nov 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2678
Section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act, referred
to in subsec (b), was repealed by Pub L 95-598, title III,
§ 327, Nov 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2679 A subsec (g),
containing similar provisions, was added to section 733
by Pub L 97-35, title XXVII, § 2730, Aug 13, 1981, 95

Stat 919 Section 733 was subsequently omitted m the
general revision of subchapter V of chapter 6 A of Title
42, The Public Health and Welfare, by Pub L 102-408,
title I, §102, Oct 13, 1992, 106 Stat 1994 See section
292f(g)ofTitle42
Amendments
2005-Pub L 109-8, §1209(1), transferred par (15) and
inserted it after subsec (a)(14A) See 1994 Amendments
note below
Pub L 109-8, §215(3), in par (15), inserted "to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and" before
"not of the kind" and "or" after "court of record," and
substituted a semicolon for "unless"(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt
from income or property of the debtor not reasonably
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the
debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of
expenditures necessary foi the continuation, preservation,
and operation of such business, or
"(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor,"
Subsec (a) Pub L 109-8, §714(2), inserted at end "For
purposes of this subsection, the term 'return' means a
return that satisfies the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy
law (including applicable
filing
requirements) Such term includes a return prepared
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written
stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a
nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return
made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law "
Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 109-8, § 1502(a)(2), substituted
"507(a)(3)" for "507(a)(2)"
Subsec (a)(1)(B) Pub L 109-8, §714(1)(A), inserted "or
equivalent report or notice," after "a return," in
introductory provisions
Subsec (a)(l)(B)(i) Pub L 109-8, §714(1 )(B), inserted
"or given" after "filed"
Subsec (a)(l)(B)(u) Pub L 109-8, §714(1 )(C), inserted
"or given" aftei "filed" and ",[ ]report, or notice" after
"return"
Subsec (a)(2)(C) Pub L 109-8, §310, amended subpar
(C) generally Pnoi to amendment, subpar (C) read as
follows "for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, consumer debts owed to a single creditor and
aggregating more than $1,000 for 'luxury goods or
services' incurred by an individual debtor on or withm 60

days before the order for relief under this title, or cash
advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are
extensions ofconsumei credit under an open end credit
plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60
days before the order for relief under this title, are
presumed to be nondischargeable, 'luxury goods or
services' do not include goods or services reasonably
acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor, an extension of consumer credit
under an open end credit plan is to be defined for
purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the
Consumer Credit Protection Act,"
Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 109-8, §215(1 )(A), added par (5)
and struck out former par (5) which read as follows "to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony
to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
or other order of a court of record, determination made in
accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but
not to the extent that"(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily,
by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts
assigned pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social
Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned
to the Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State), or
"(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,"

"but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period
during which"(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the
condominium or cooperative project, or
"(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and
received payments from the tenant for such period,"
Subsec (a)(17) Pub L 109-8, §301, substituted "on a
prisoner by any court" for "by a court" and "subsection
(b) or (f)(2) of section 1915" for "section 1915 (b) or (f)"
and inserted "(or a similar non-Federal law)" after "title
28" m two places
Subsec (a)(18) Pub L 109-8, §224(c), added par (18)
Pub L 109-8, §215(1 )(B), struck out par (18) which
read as follows "owed under State law to a State or
municipality that IS"(A) m the nature of support, and
"(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social
Security Act (42 U S C 601 et seq ), or"
Subsec (a)(19)(B) Pub L 109-8, § 1404(a), inserted ",[
]before, on, or after the date on which the petition was
filed," after "results" in introductory provisions
Subsec (c)(1) Pub L 109-8, §215(2), substituted "or
(6)" for "(6), or (15)" in two places
Subsec (e) Pub L 109-8, §1209(3), substituted
insured" for "a insured"

"an

Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 109-8, §220, added par (8) and
struck out former par (8) which read as follows "for an
educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any
program funded m whole oi m part by a governmental
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or
stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under
this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents,"

1998-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 105-244 substituted
"stipend, unless" for "stipend, unless-" and struck out
"(B)" before "excepting such debt" and subpar (A) which
read as follows "such loan, benefit, scholarship, or
stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years
(exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment
period) before the date of the filing of the petition, or"

Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 109-8, §1209(2), substituted
"motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft" for "motor vehicle"

1996-Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 104-193, §374(a)(4),
substituted "section 408 (a)(3)" for "section 402 (a)(26)"

Subsec (a)(14A)
(14A)

Subsec (a)(17) Pub L 104-134 added par (17)

Subsec
(14B)

Pub L 109-8, §314(a), added par

(a)(14B) Pub L

109-8, §1235, added par

Subsec (a)(16) Pub L 109-8, §412, struck out
"dwelling" after "debtor's interest in a" and "housing"
after "share of a cooperative" and substituted
"ownership," for "ownership or" and "or a lot m a
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the
trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership
interest in such unit, such corporation, or such lot," for

2002-Subsec (a)(19) Pub L 107-204 added par (19)

Subsec (a)(18) Pub L 104-193, §374(a)(l)-(3), added
par (18)
1994-Par (15) Pub L 103-394, §304(e)[(l)], amended
this section by adding par (15) at the end See 2005
Amendment note above
Subsec (a) Pub L 103-394, §501(d)(13)(A)(i),
substituted "1141," for "1141,," m introductory
provisions

Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 103-394,
substituted "507(a)(8)" for "507(a)(7)"

§304(h)(3),

Subsec (a)(2)(C) Pub L 103-394, §§306, 501
(d)(13)(A)(n), substituted "$1,000 for" for "$500 for",
"60" for "forty" after "incurred by an individual debtor on
or within", and "60" for "twenty" after "obtained by an
individual debtor on or within", and struck out "(15
U S C 1601 et seq )" after "Protection Act"
Subsec (a)(ll) Pub L 103-322, §320934(1), struck out
"or" after semicolon at end
Subsec (a)(12) Pub L 103-322, §320934(2), which
directed the substitution of",[ ]or" for a period at end of
par (12), could not be executed because a period did not
appear at end
Subsec (a)(13) Pub L 103-394, §221(1), substituted
semicolon for period at end

wherein liability was incurred by such debtoi as a result
of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally
intoxicated undei the laws or regulations of any
jurisdiction within the United States or its territories
wherein such motor vehicle was operated and witlnn
which such liability was incurred, or"
Subsec (a)(ll), (12) Pub L
added pars (11) and (12)

101-647, §2522(a)(l),

Subsec (c) Pub L 101-647, §2522(a)(3), designated
existing provisions as par (1) and added par (2)
Subsec (e) Pub L 101-647, §2522(a)(2), added subsec
(e)
1986-Subsec (a) Pub L 99-554, § 257(n), inserted
reference to sections 1228 (a) and 1228 (b) of tins title
Subsec (a)(1)(A) Pub L 99-554, § 283ij)(l)(A),
substituted "507(a)(7)" for "507(a)(6)"

Pub L 103-322, §320934(3), added par (13)
Subsec (a)(14)
(14)

Pub L 103-394, §221(2), added par

Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 99-554, § 281, struck out the
comma after "decree" and inserted ",[ ]detennmation
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit," after "record"

Subsec (a)(16) Pub L 103-394, §309, added par (16)
Subsec (b) Pub L 103-394, §501 (d)(l3)(B), struck out
"(20 U S C 1087-3)" after "Act of 1965" and "(42 U S C
294f)" after "Service Act"

Subsec (a)(9), (10) Pub L 99-554, § 283(j)(l)(B),
redesignated par (9) relating to debts incurred by persons
driving while intoxicated, added by Pub L 98-353, as
(10)

Subsec (c)(1) Pub L 103-394, §304(e)(2), substituted
"(6), or (15)" foi "or (6)" in two places

Subsec (b) Pub L 99-554, § 283(j)(2), substituted
"Service" for "Services"

Subsec (e) Pub L 103-394, §50l(d)(13)(C), substituted
"insured depository institution" for "depository institution
or insured credit union"

1984-Subsec (a)(2) Pub L 98-353, § 454(a)(1), in
provisions preceding subpar (A), struck out "obtaining"
after "for", and substituted "refinancing of credit, to the
extent obtained" for "refinance of credit,"

1990-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 101-647, §3621, substituted
"for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made
under any program funded in whole or m part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an
obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless" for "for an
educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded m
whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit
institution, unless" m introductory provisions and
amended subpar (A) generally Prior to amendment,
subpar (A) read as follows "such loan first became due
before five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension
of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of
the petition, or"
Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 101-581 and Pub L 101-647,
§3102(a), identically amended par (9) generally Prior to
amendment, par (9) lead as follows "to any entity, to the
extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent
decree entered in a court of record against the debtor

Subsec (a)(2)(A) Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(1), struck out
"or" at end
Subsec (a)(2)(B) Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(2), inserted
"or" at end
Subsec (a)(2)(B)(in) Pub L 98-353, § 454(a)(1)(A),
struck out "obtaining" before "such"
Subsec (a)(2)(C)
subpar (C)

Pub L 98-353, § 307(a)(3), added

Subsec (a)(5) Pub L 98-353, § 454(b)(1), inserted "or
other order of a court of record" after "divorce decree," in
provisions preceding subpar (A)
Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 98-353, § 454(b)(2), inserted
",[ ]or any such debt winch has been assigned to the
Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State"
Subsec (a)(8)

Pub L 98-353, §§371(1), 454(a)(2),

struck out "of higher education" after "a nonprofit
institution of and struck out "or" at end

7,1998]"
Effective Date of

Subsec (a)(9) Pub L 98-353, § 371(2), added the par
(9) relating to debts incurred by persons driving while
intoxicated
Subsec (c) Pub L 98-353, § 454(c), inserted "of a kind"
after "debt"
Subsec (d) Pub L 98-353, § 307(b), substituted "the
court shall grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the
costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the
proceeding if the court finds that the position of the
creditor was not substantially justified, except that the
court shall not award such costs and fees if special
circumstances would make the award unjust" for "the
court shall grant judgment against such creditor and m
favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable
attorney's fee for, the proceeding to determine
dischargeability, unless such granting of judgment would
be clearly inequitable"
1981-Subsec (a)(5)(A) Pub L 97-35 substituted "law,
or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to
section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act)," for "law,
or otherwise,"
1979-Subsec (a)(8) Pub L 96-56 substituted "for an
educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in
whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit
institution of higher education" for "to a governmental
unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an
educational loan" in the provisions preceding subpar (A)
and inserted "(exclusive of any applicable suspension of
the repayment period)" after "before five years" in
subpar (A)
Effective Date of 2005 Amendment
Pub L 109-8, title XIV, §1404(b),Apr 20,2005, 119
Stat 215, provided that "The amendment made by
subsection (a) [amending tins section] is effective
beginning July 30, 2002 "
Amendment by sections 215, 220, 224(c), 301, 310,
314(a), 412, 714, 1209, 1235, and 1502(a)(2) of Pub L
109-8 effective 180 days after Apr 20,2005, and not
applicable with respect to cases commenced under this
title before such effective date, except as otherwise
provided, see section 1501 of Pub L 109-8, set out as a
note under section 101 of this title
Effective Date of 1998 Amendment
Pub L 105-244, title IX, §971(b), Oct 7,1998, 112
Stat 1837, provided that "The amendment made by
subsection (a) [amending tins section] shall apply only
with respect to cases commenced under title 11, United
States Code, after the date of enactment of this Act [Oct

Amendment

Section 374(c) of Pub| L 104-193 provided that "The
amendments made by tjhis section [amending this section
and section 656 of Title 42, The Public Health and
Welfare] shall appl)| only with respect to cases
commenced under title 11 of the United States Code after
the date of the enactmeht ofthisAct[Aug 22,1996] "
For provisions relating Ito effective date of title III of Pub
L 104-193, see sectiol 395 (a)-(c) of Pub L 104-193,
set out as a note under Section 654 of Title 42, The Public
Health and Welfare
Effective Date of 19941 Amendment
Amendment by Pub L 103-394 effective Oct 22,1994,
and not applicable w|th respect to cases commenced
under this title before t>ct 22, 1994, see section 702 of
Pub L 103-394, set o^it as a note under section 101 of
this title
Effective Date of 1990| Amendments
Section 3104 of title X|XXI of Pub L 101-647 provided
that
"(a) Effective Date -This title and the amendments made
by this title [amending this section and section 1328 of
this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under
section 101 of this titlel shall take effect on the date of
the enactment oftlnsAtt [Nov 29, 1990]
"(b) Application of Amjendments The amendments made
by this title [amending| this section and section 1328 of
this title] shall not apply with respect to cases
commenced under titte 11 of the United States Code
before the date of the enactment of tins Act"
Amendment by section 3621 of Pub L 101-647 effective
180 days after Nov 29 J 1990, see section 3631 of Pub L
101-647, set out as an (Effective Date note under section
3001 ofTitle28,Judicikry and Judicial Procedure
Section 4 of Pub L 10J-5 81 provided that
"(a) Effective Date -Thjlis Act and the amendments made
by this Act [amending J this section and section 1328 of
this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under
section 101 of this title] shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of tins A^t [Nov 15, 1990]
"(b) Application of Amf sndments -The amendments made
by this Act [amending tins section and section 1328 of
this title] shall not apply with respect to cases
commenced under titl^ 11 of the United States Code
before the date of the eiiactment of this Act"
Effective Date of 1986 (Amendment

Amendment by section 257 of Pub L 99-554 effective
30 days after Oct 27, 1986, but not applicable to cases
commenced under this title before that date, see section
302(a), (c)(1) of Pub L 99-554, set out as a note under
section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Amendment by sections 281 and 283 of Pub L 99-554
effective 30 days after Oct 27, 1986, see section 302(a)
of Pub L 99-554
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by Pub L 98-353 effective with respect to
cases filed 90 days aftei July 10,1984, see section 552(a)
of Pub L 98-353, set out as a note under section 101 of
this title
Effective Date of 1981 Amendment
Amendment by Pub L 97-35 effective Aug 13,1981,
see section 2334(c) of Pub L 97-35, set out as a note
under section 656 of Title 42, The Public Health and
Welfare
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TOMR KEETCH
TERI KEETCH
2413 High Mountain Duvc
Sandy, Utah 84092
(801)553-9149
JN THE UNITED STATES BANICRUPTCY
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In Re:

NO. 2:07-bk-02532-SSC
(Chapter 7)

THOMAS R KEETCH and
TERfL. KEETCH,

Adv. No. 2:07-ap-00509-SSC

Debtors.

DEBTOR'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

PAUt A. TIMOTHY and JANfCE
1 h\'(OTHYr husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.

THOMAS R. KEETCH and
TERI L. KEETCH,
Defendants.

Thomas R. Keetch and Teri Keetch, s bmil the following Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motior for Summary Judgment.

1

Plaintiffs use as a factual basis for their Memorandum the Findings of the Fouith Judicial
District Court for Utah County, The Statement of Facts does not identify the undcilying
evidence from which the Findings and Conclusions are derived.
Defendants cannot deny that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw are in fact the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court and consequently cannot deny the
Statement of Facts as presented because they arc the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of
the District Court.
The Ruling of Judge Laycock is presently on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (See
attached Notice) If this Court is merely going to adopt the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law from the District Court in Utah, then the Court should defer its determination until the
completion of the appeal in Utah.
On the other hand, if this Court is making a de novo determination of the matter, then the
Statement of Facts to this Court^should be based upon the actual testimony of the witnesses and
this Court should make its own determinations or to have a separate trial where evidence is
taken.
The Defendants Statement of Facts contains the actual deposition or trial testimony
pertinent to the issue of fraud.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Attached hereto is a copy of the Amended Complaint fded by the Plaintiffs.

2

2.

Paragraph 13 sets out three claims which form the basis for Plaintiffs allegation

for fraud as follows:
13.

On or before September 28, 2001, Defendants made certain false

representations to the Plaintiffs as hereinafter set forth:
a.
That the Keetches would pledge to the Plaintiffs the horse called
"Hcsa Son of a Dun" as collateral for the aforementioned loan; and
b.
That the Keetches would use all of the monies received from the
loan to purchase additional horses; and
c.
That Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances and could be used by the Defendants as collateral for the
aforementioned loan.
Judge Laycock specifically ruled that the basis for Plaintiffs claim for fraud was limited
only to the issues raised in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint subparagraphs a, b, and c.
The Plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence with regard to thefilingof a bankruptcy as an
additional claim for fraud. Counsel for Defendant objected on the basis of relevancy because
that issue had not been pled and the Court ruled as follows:
THE COURT: In looking at the amended
compliant in the fraud claim, paragraph 13, it reads, "On or before
September 28,2001, the defendants made certain false
representations to the Plaintiff as hereafter set forth. A, that the
Keetches would pledge to Plaintiffs the horse Pie's a Son of a Dim
as collateral for the aforementioned loan; and B that the Keetches
would use all moneys received from the loan to purchase
additional horses; and, C, that He's a Son of a Dun was free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used by the
Defendants for the aforementioned loan."
3

The statute - Pm sorry - the rule, in the rule of
civil procedure, allows notice pleading, which means you can
generally put the other side on notice as to what the claims are
except for fraud, which has to be plead with particularity, as has
noted by both parties here in their arguments. And I think what
that means is that to at trial marshal all the evidence that you can
about anything that might be fraudulently said is an unfair attack by
the Plaintiff, because the requirement is that the statements be
pleaded with particularity so the other side does have notice.
And so I think the case, the plaintiffs' case is
limited to the three claims that are made under 13 - paragraph 13
in the amended complaint. So I agree. I sustain the objection.
See T: page 57 line 2 to page 58 line 1.
3.

At the time the parties entered into the Promissory Note, there was a UCC

financing statement recorded with the State of Utah evidencing the existing lien on Hesa Son of a
Dun. (See paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint attached. Said allegation was
admitted in Respondent's answer.)
4,

The Timothys failed to search the UCC records for liens prior to completing the

Q:
So I take it if you didn't know what it was at the
time you did not check to see if there was a UCC filing?
A:
We did not.
T: page 392 line 2 to 4
5.

Paul Timothy conceded that the representation in the amended complaint

paragraph 13 subparagraph "b" was never made. Specifically Mr. Timothy testified as follows:
Q:

So what you are saying is that Teri never
4

represented to you that she would use the money received from the
loan to purchase additional horses?
A.

She said to save the horses.

Q.
She never told you that the purpose of the moneys
received would be, from the loan, would be to purchase additional
horses?
A.

Save the horses, whatever that meant.

Q:
Let me be specific. Is your testimony, did Teri ever
represent to you that the money received from the loan was to
purchase additional horses.
A:

I never heard that.

See T: page 411 line 14 to line 25
6.

As it relates to paragraph 13(a) of the amended complaint, not only does the

allegation refer to an event in the future and consequently there could be no present intent to
defraud or an existing fact but more importantly the Plaintiffs made no effort after the signing of
the note to create a security interest in the horse. Mr. Timothy testified as follows:
Q:
There was a period of time between this promissory note
and the time you found out that He's a Son of a Dun was collateral
and had been taken. Is that fair?
A;
There was a gap there where we did not know he had been
previously collateralized? Is that your question?
Q:

Right.

A:

The answer is yes.

5

Q:
And during [hat period of time did you make any efforts to
secure a security interest in He's a Son of a Dun?
A:

No.

T: Page 434 line 22 to page 435 line 6,
7.

In the months prior to entering into the Promissory Note between the parties, the

Defendants Ten and Thomas Keetch (hereinafter the Keetches) had been working with a loan
broker namely Rebecca Mendenhall in order to purchase (along with other investors) a
therapeutic horse ranch. T: page 437 line 18 to page 440 line 25. Also T: 442 line 20 to page
444 line 25.
8.

For several months prior to the signing of the Promissory Note, the Keetches had

looked at potential properties to purchase, had submitted financial information both for the
Keetches and other partners to Rebecca Mendenhall and had provided any and all infomiation
that Becky Mendenhall had requested for purposes of finding long term financing for the
therapeutic horse ranch. T: page 445 line 19 to page 446 line 10.
9.

Rebecca Mendenhall came to the Keetches and informed them that she had a

client namely Paul and Janice Timothy (hereinafter Timothys) who would be willing to provide a
bridge loan to the Keetches and assured the Keetches that the long term financing had been
approved and that the bridge loan from the Timothys would be repaid out of the long term
financing;. T: 446 lines 11 to 447 line 1.
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10.

Paul Timothy testified at trial that they entered into the loan with the Keetchcs

based upon the assurance from Rebecca Mendcnhall that the long term financing would be
available to repay the bridge loan. T: 422 lines 12 to 18.
11.

Becky Mendcnhall brokered and negotiated the terms of the loan directly with the

Timothys. T: 452 lines 20 to 454 Line 18.
12.

Rebecca Mendenhall was the one who drafted the Promissory Note. T: page 454

lines 19 to 23.
13.

There was only one occasion wherein Teri Keetch had direct contact with either of

the Plaintiffs which was a meeting at McDonalds in Lehi, Utah, the details of the discussion will
be discussed in detail later herein. T: Page 449 line 15 to page 450 line 5. Also T; page 409 lines
5 to 8.
14.

There was only one occasion in which Thomas Keetch had contact with the

Timothys which occurred on the day of closing at Becky Mendenhalfs office for the purpose of
signing the Promissory Note and exchanging money. T: page 409 lines 9 to 12.
15.

The Court does not make separate findings of the evidence relating to Thomas

Keetch as opposed to the evidence relating to Teri Keetch, yet the Court should have entered
findings regarding each of the elements of fraud as it relates to the defendants separately. (See
Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner with their Motion for Summary Judgment)
16.

The Findings and Conclusions make some reference to an agency relationship

7

between Thomas ICeetch and Teri ICeetch, yet an agency responsibility for fraud was not pled.
(See attached Complaint)
17.

Both Thomas Keetch and Rebecca Mendenhall testified at Tnal that the issue of

whether Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used
by Defendants as collateral was never discussed at the time the paitties signed the closing
documents. T: page 50 line 23 to page 51 line 6. Also T: page 34$ lines 13 to 24.
18.

Janice Timothy (one of the Plaintiffs herein) testified at her deposition as

follows:
Q:
Well, I'm trying to sort out what was represented by Tom versus
what was represented by Becky.
A:
Well, I don't remember specific conversations, you know, he said,
she said. But we were all their together. We went over everything, and he was in
agreement to everything she was saying. I mean there wasnI't any discussion that,
oh, we had this horse already collateralized or we have really had a bankruptcy or
were in bankruptcy or anything. None of that ever came up. (See deposition of
Janice Timothy page 26 lines 12-22)

19.

At Trial Janice Timothy stated:
Q:
In that conversation was anything mentioned about
whether or not they owned He's a Son of a Dim, and ([ say "they"
Tom and Ten owned He's a son of a Dun free and clear, or
whether or not they had posted He's a Son of a Dun ^s collateral to
another person?
A:
It was always implied that he was fred and clear.
There was never any mention of him being collateralized or there
was no way I would have signed this.
T: page 280 lines 11 to 18
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Later Ms. Timothy also testified:
Q:
On September 28, 2001, did you discuss with Tom whether or not he had
ever declared bankruptcy or whether he was in bankruptcy?
A:
No, I did not.
T: page 281 line 23 to page 282 line 1
20.

The Court found pursuant to Finding 11:

Paul and Janice Timothy also testified. There were small conflicts in their
testimony. None of those conflicts were material to the outcome of the case. The
Courtfindsthat the conflicts were justified in the length of time that had accrued
since the events giving rise to the lawsuit and the Trial. Although the Timothys'
memory may have faded to some extent, they were both credible witnesses, (see
Finding #11)
21.

Clearly if the Court found that Janice Timothy was a credible witness, then her

testimony exonerates Thomas Keetch from any fraudulent representation because Janice Timothy
was present in the very meeting and only meeting with Thomas Keetch wherein Paul Timothy
alleges the misrepresentation to have occurred.
22.

No where in the Findings or Conclusions does the Court reconcile the clear

inconsistency between the testimony of Paul Timothy and Janice Timothy, yet at the same time
finds them both to be credible witnesses.
23.

Mr. Timothy testified at his deposition as follows:

Q:
If I asked you what a purchase money security interest is, could you
tell me?
A:
Wouldn't have a clue.
Q:
Do you have any idea how to create a security interest in a horse?
A:
Apparently not.
[deposition of Paul Timothy, P. 10, L. 20-25]
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24.

Even though Mr. Timothy did not even know that it was possible that a lien could

be placed on a horse, he somehow had the wherewithal to apparently ask and receive a
representation horn Thomas Keetch that there were no liens against the horse and that Hesa Son
of a Dun could be placed as collateral. (See Findings of the Utah Court)
25.

The single occasion in which Teri Keetch had contact with the Plaintiff was a

contact only between Teri Keetch and Paul Timothy which occurred in the days just prior to the
signing of the Promissory Note. T: Page 449 line 15 to page 450 line 5. Also T; page 409 lines 5
to 8.
26.

At the time of the meeting the Timothys resided in Pleasant Grove; the Keetches

resided in Salt Lake County and Hesa Son of a Dun was stabled in Lehi, Utah, i.e. Utah County.
Rebecca Mendenhall's office also was located in Salt Lake County.
27.

Teri Keetch received a phone call from Rebecca Mendenhall who indicated that

she did not have time to meet with Paul Timothy to show him where Hesa Son of a Dun was
located and asked Teri Keetch if she could meet Mr. Timothy at the McDonalds in Lehi, Utah,
and then have him follow her to the location of the horse. T: page 450 lines 8 to 18.
28.

Although the parties' testimony with regard to what occurred at the meetmg

differs substantially, not only in the length of the meeting, what was discussed in the meeting but
even as to whether the parties ate lunch together. Teri Keetch contends that the issue of any liens
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against the horse or money owed on Hesa Son of a Dun was never raised or discussed in the
meeting that those were all issues resolved between Mr, Timothy and their broker Becky
Mendenhall. T: page 453 line 17 to page 454 line 21.
29.

Teri Keetch contends that Becky Mendenhall was well aware of the UCC filing on

Hesa Son of a Dun because she had informed Becky Mendenhall of the UCC filing and that it
was Becky Mendenhall who was negotiating the terms of the agreement on behalf of the
Keetches. T: page 442 line 20 to page 445 tine 2.
30.

The Timothys at no time made efforts to obtain credit reports for Tom and/or Teri

Keetch; to search bankruptcy records to determine if a bankruptcy by either of them had been
filed at any point in time; at no time did the Timothys ask for financial statements or any loan
application documentation regarding credit worthiness. T: page 433 lines 10 to page 434 line 21
POINT I
THE TIMOTHYS WERE IMPARTED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF
THE LIENS AGAINST HESA SON OF A DUN BASED UPON THE UCC
FILINGS ON RECORD WITH THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Utah Supreme Court in J.R. Simplot Company, et aL v. Sales King International., et
ah, 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) set out the standard with regard to the notice that is provided by
filing a UCC filing statement with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled as follows:
I. SECURITY INTERESTS
[*P14] Part of the underlying purpose of the UCC is to
11

"simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions.'' Utah Code Amu § 70/1-1-102(2) {\991)\ see also
InsleyMfg. Corp. v. Draper Batik & Trust, 717 P. 2d 1341, 1346
(Utah 1986) (noting that "[a] secured party should be able to rely
on his compliance with the Code's requirements for perfection");
79 C.J.S. 'Secured Transactions § 2 (1995) (stating that the code's
"general purpose is to create a precise guide for commercial
transactions under which businessmen may predict with confidence
the results of their dealings"). Furthermore, "the fundamental
purpose of Article 9[4 ] is to give notice to third persons and
simplify the filing process." 9 Ronald A. Anderson & Laiy
Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial [***9] Code §
401:5, at 483 (3d ed. rev. 1999); see also Insley, 717 P.2d at 1345
("The purpose and concept of notice filing would be significantly
weakened if we held that [the party] is not bound by that which it
would have discovered through a proper inquiry."); 79 C J.S.
supra, § 53, at 438 (stating that purpose of filing includes
protection of creditor "by furnishing to others intending to enter
into a transaction with the debtor a starting point for investigation
which will result in fair warning with respect to the transaction
contemplated"). As such, a party who has secured its interest in
accordance with article 9 has priority, upon a debtor's default,
"over 'anyone anywhere, anyhow' except as otherwise provided by
the remaining Code priority rules," Insley, 717 P. 2d at 1347
(quoting Continental [**1105] Am, Life Ins, Co. v. Griffin, 251
Ga. 412, 306S.E.2d285, 287 (Ga. 1983)); see also Anderson &
Lawrence, supra, § 9-312:6, at 330 (noting that conflicts of
security interests are determined exclusively by article 9).

If the court determines that the information contained within the UCC filing provides
constructive notice then the Timothy's fraud claim fails in its entirety. The only viable fraud
claim the Timothy's have is the claim that the Keetches represented that "Hesa Son of a Dun was
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be used by the defendants as collateral for
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the loan."
The Plaintiffs acknowledged the existence of the UCC filing and the associated notice of
the lien in their Amended Complaint. (See ^(14).
If the Timothy's had constructive notice then the credibility of the witnesses becomes
immaterial
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT THE TIMOTHYS WERE
NOT BOUND BY THE NOTICE GIVEN BY THE UCC FILING BECAUSE
THE TIMOTHYS WERE UNAWARE OF THE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
The Trial Court in reaching its conclusion relied upon Robinson v. Tripco, 21 P.3d 219
(Utah App. 2000) which is a BFtah Court of Appeals case wherein the Court of Appeals stated,
To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance 'must be
considered with reference to the facts of each case5 Condor 739 P.2 638. In
general, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on a positive assertions of fact without
independent investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts
should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived,
that a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation.
The Trial Court concluded based upon the foregoing that the reasonable reliance prong
was a "subjective" analysis of what the Timothys actually knew and because the Timothys were
unaware of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions that they were not bound by the
constructive notice nor did the Timothys have an obligation to search the UCC filings to
determine whether there were any liens.
13

The foregoing analysis should be balanced in light of other cases and in fact the very next
paragraph in the Robinson case, the Court of Appeals stated;
id (citations admitted). In addition, fraud as relates to the purchase of real
estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the truth of which could
have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by the party asserting their
falsity" Maach v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 577
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). See Robinson at p. 225.

It is clear that the Court in Robinson intended that at least in the context of a real estate
transaction that a party would be bound by the information obtained from a County Recorder.
It is not a pioper excuse or defense by a party to say that because 1 was unaware of a
statutory provision that I am not bound by its provision. Mr. Timothy was a sophisticated person
in the area of contracts. His employment for much of his life was negotiating labor contracts on
behalf of large corporations and further both Mr. and Mrs. Timothy had their real estate licenses
which would make them aware of recording and notice details at least in the area of real estate
transactions. It is not a defense to a criminal prosecution to come before the Court and say that I
was not aware that certain conduct was illegal and therefore I should not be prosecuted. It would
not be proper for the Keetches to come before this Court and say that because they were unaware
that a fraud claim was nondischargeable in bankruptcy that we are not bound by those statutory
provisions.
The Timothys should not be allowed to assert that because they did not know about the
notice imparted by the UCC filings that they are not bound by the notice requirements.
14

Interestingly even the Judge in rendering her opinion appeared to justi fy the Timothys defense by
asserting that until this case she was unaware that a security interest could be obtained on a horse
through a (JCC filing. The Judge in her ruling stated:
... Mr. Timothy had done some of their own investigation. As
horse owners they had some knowledge. Apparently, they didn't
know that you could file on a UCC ~ do a UCC filing on a horse,
didn't know what a UCC filing was; and frankly, until last
Thursday neither did I. It never occurred to me that you could do a
UCCfilingon a living animal.
T: page 561 lines 2 to 7.
There are a number of other cases which give clarification to the reasonable reliance
prong as follows: The Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Company, 915
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996) stated:
No matter how naive and inexperienced the Defendants were, they could
not close their eyes and accept unquestionably any representations made to them,
It was their duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under
the circumstances would dictate .... The one who complains of being injured by
such a false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him
but has the duty of exercising such a degree of care to protect his own interest as
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own neglect.
It is apparent from the above citation that it is not a subjective analysis of what the
Timothys actually did or did not know but rather an objective analysis of what an ordinary
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances would have done.
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The Court of Appeals in Maach v. Resource Design and Construction, fac., 875 P.2d 570
(UlahApp. 1994) stated:
Although the Klas opinion focused on the issue of unilateral
mistake, this court further determined that the defendants'
counterclaim for fraud and misrepresentation was properly
dismissed:
In light of our determination that defendants' conduct did not rise
to the level of ordinary diligence, it follows that the trial court
correctly dismissed defendants' counterclaim for fraud and
misrepresentation. "Fraud as related [**17] to purchase of real
estate may not be predicated on alleged false statements the truth of
which could have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by
the party asserting their falsity." Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic,
Inc. Pension Trust, 566 PM 429, 431 (Old. 1977) (quoting Onstott
v. Osborne, 417 P,2d 291, 293 (Old. 1966)). Defendants could
have ascertained with reasonable diligence the truth or falsity of
Carol Klas's alleged misrepresentations by requesting copies of
the appraisals, or demanding to laiow the basis for her
information, or by obtaining an independent appraisal of the
subject property prior to executing the agreement. Since the means
of knowledge were available to defendants and since they failed to
avail themselves of these means, they cannot now claim to have
been deceived by the representations of the vendor. See SokolosJcy,

566P.2dat431.

829 P.2d at 141 n.9 (emphasis added).
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not included due diligence
as an element of negligent misrepresentation, it has required a
somewhat analagous element of "reasonable reliance." [*"H18] See
Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59 (negligent misrepresentation requires
reasonable reliance by injured party). 5 Therefore, in order to
successfully bring an action for negligent misrepresentation, the
Maacks must demonstrate that they at least took reasonable steps to
ascertain the truth of Kesselring's representation that there was a one-
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year builder's warranty, or, worded differently, that the Maacks'
reliance on Kesselring's statement without some further inquiry was
reasonable under the circumstances.

The Court requires an objective standard of what a reasonable person would
have done under the circumstances.
POINT III
AS IT RELATES TO THE ALLEGED
MISREPRESENTATION BY THOMAS KEETCH, THE
COURT CANNOT FIND THAT BOTH MRS. TIMOTHY AND
MR. TIMOTHY ARE CREDIBLE WITNESSES.
The Utah District Court made the following Findings of Fact contained in
paragraph 11 which reads:
Paul and Janice Timothy also testified. There were some
small conflicts in their testimony. None of those conflicts were
material to the outcome of the case. The Court finds that the conflicts
were justified in the length of time that has accrued since the events
giving rise to this lawsuit and the Trial. Although the Timothys
memories may have faded to some extent, they are both credible
witnesses.
As set out in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Timothy admitted that subparagraph 13 (b) of
the Amended Complaint which claimed "that the Keetches would use all of the money received
from the loan to purchase additional horses was inaccurate and not a representation that he made,
See paragraph 5 of he State of Facts above.
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Likewise subparagraph 13 (a) the Amended Complaint which slates:

That the

Keetches would pledge to Plaintiffs5 horse called Hesa Son of a Dun as collateral for the
aforementioned loan docs not provide a basis for fraud in that it is a statement as to what they
would do in the future, i.e. not a presently existing fact and in fact the Keetches did pledge Hesa
Son of a Dun as collateral although the Timothys never attempted to perfect a security interest in
the horse.
The single remaining issue upon which fraud is claimed by the Timothys is on the issue
of whether Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be
used by the Defendants as collateral for the aforementioned loan.
The only time that Janice Timothy had contact with either of the Defendants was at the
closing and Tom Keetch was the only Defendant that was present. Mr. Timothy testified that
Thomas Keetch represented that Hesa Son of Dun was free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances.
Thomas Keetch, Rebecca Mendenhall and Mrs. Timothy all testified that in the meeting
where the contract was signed that there was no discussion regarding a representation that Hesa
Son of a Dun was held free and clear and there were no liens against the horse.
At deposition, Janice Timothy testified as follows:
Q:
Well, I'm trying to sort out what was represented by Tom versus
what was represented by Becky.
A:
Well, I don't remember specific conversations, you know, he said,
she said. But we were all their together. We went over everything, and he was in
18

agreement to everything she was saying. [ mean there wasn't any discussion that,
oh, we had this horse already collateralized or we have really had a bankruptcy or
were in bankruptcy or anything. None of that ever came up. (See deposition of
Janice Timothy page 26 lines 12-22)

At Trial Janice Timothy stated:
Q:
In that conversation was anything mentioned about
whether or not they owned He's a Son of a Dun, and I say "they"
Tom and Ten owned Pie's a son of a Dun free and clear, or
whether or not they had posted He's a Son of a Dun as collateral to
another person?
A:
It was always implied that he wasfreeand clear.
There was never any mention of him being collateralized or there
was no way I would have signed this.
T:page280 lines 11 to 18
Later Ms. Timothy also testified:
Q:
On September 28, 2001, did you discuss with Tom whether or not he had
ever declared bankruptcy or whether he was in bankruptcy?
A:
No, I did not.
T: page 281 line 23 to page 282 line 1

Becky Mendenhall (the broker) testified at Trial as follows:
Q:
During the day of the closing do you recall
any conversations that occurred with regard to whether the
Keetches had filed bankruptcy?
A:
There were no conversations as far as
a bankruptcy being filed.
Q:
Was there any conversations on that
day with regard to the credit worthiness of the
19

Keetches?
A:
No.
Q:
Was there any discussion on that day
whether Hesa Son of a Dun had been collateralized
as part of a separate loan?
A
There was no discussion.
T: page 348 lines 13 to 24
The difference in testimony was not a minor discrepancy between the parties. Paul
Timothy specifically testified that a representation was made by Tom Keetch at closing, that the
horses were free and clear and could be used as collateral for the loan. Janice Timothy testified
just the opposite saying that issue was never discussed. If the issue was never discussed, then
there was no representation made by Thomas Keetch and consequently no misrepresentation.
Although it was not properly pled as part of the Amended Complaint, Mr. Paul Timothy
specifically testified that he asked if Tom Keetch had filed bankmptcy yet his wife Janice
Timothy testified that the issues was never discussed with Tom Keetch at the closing.
If the Court determined that Janice Timothy's testimony was credible and that the issue of
collateral and bankmptcy was never discussed at the closing, then it would also tend to discredit
Mr, Timothy's testimony that in his one on one meeting with Ten! Keetch, that maybe Tern
Keetch was more credible when she represented that the same issues were not discussed in her
meeting with Mr. Timothy.
The Court could not find both Paul Timothy and Janice Timothy to be credible witnesses
without somehow reconciling their testimony. Yet the Court determined by clear and convincing
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evidence that Mr. Timothy's testimony established fraudulent representations.
The foregoing should also be balanced against Mr. Timothy's statements that in the
context of speaking with reasonable reliance he claims that he did not even know that a horse
could be the subject of a lien and used as collateral. At deposition, Mr. Timothy testified as
follows:
Q:
If I asked you what a purchase money security interest is, could you
tell me?
A:
Wouldn't have a clue.
Q:
Do you have any idea how to create a security interest in a horse?
A:
Apparently not.
[deposition of Paul Timothy, P. 10, L. 20-25]

Yet when he discusses the issue in terms of whether a representation was made, he has
the coincidental wherewithal to specifically ask Teri Keetch in the single meeting between him
and Teri as well as the meeting with Thomas Keetch his wife and Becky Mendenliall"' if any of
the animals she would put up for collateral was encumbered. I asked her if she had ever been
under bankruptcy." T: page 423 lines 8 to 13.
Either Mr. Timothy was truly unaware that a horse could be liened and used as collateral
for a loan and therefore he would not have had the mind set to even ask the question; or in the
alternative, Mr. Timothy was aware of the fact that there could be liens against a horse and that a
horse could be used as collateral for a loan and so he might have asked the questions, but then
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would have the corresponding obligation io conduct a reasonable and proper investigation which
would have disclosed that in fact that such a lien existed.

POINT IV
IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL SHOULD APPLY, THEN THE COURT SHOULD FOREGO
RENDERING AN OPINION UNTIL THE UTAH APPEAL PROCESS IS
COMPLETE.

This Court may conclude based upon the foregoing that the UCC filings with the Utah
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code provides constructive notice of the liens against
the horse and that as a matter of law, the Timothys could not reasonably rely on the alleged
representations and consequently there was no fraud. On the other hand the Court may conclude
that collateral estoppel does apply and that the Utah proceedings are determinative. In the event
that the Court determines that collateral estoppel does apply, then this Court should hold off
making a final determination until all of the proceedings in the Utah Courts are complete. The
Defendants have filed an appeal of the District Court's decision. It is appropriate if the Court
applies a collateral estoppel standard, then the Bankruptcy Court should hold off making a final
determination until the appeal is completed or else it may result in conflicting orders.
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POINT V

IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY AND THAT THIS
COURT MUST MAKE ITS OWN FACTUAL DETERMINATION THEN
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAILS IN THAT
THERE ARE CLEARLY ISSUES OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE
DETERMINED IN FAVOR OF THE TIMOTHYS WHICH PRECLUDES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In the alternative, if the Court determines collateral estoppel does not apply, then this
Court must make its own legal and factual determination. In the meeting between Paul Timothy
and Teri Kcetch, Teri represented that the issue of whether Hesa Son of a Dun had any liens or
used as collateral on existing loans never took place. Mr. Timothy claims otherwise. At the only
other meeting between the Keetches and the Timothys which occurred in the presence of Tom
Keetch at the closing, Tom Keetch, Becky Mendenhall and Janice Timothy all testified that the
issue of liens on Hesa Son of a Dim or whether he had been used as collateral never was
discussed, yet Mr. Timothy claims that it did. Defendants believe that the issue can be resolved
as a matter of law in that the Timothys could not reasonably rely on said representation because
of the constructive notice given to them by the UCC filings. If the courts disagrees with the
constructive notice argument then the matter cannot be resolved on summary judgment because
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of the factual dispute. Alternatively, this Court could either review the testimony given at Trial
in the Utah District Court and reach its own conclusions based upon the testimony and the record
or in the alternative would need to conduct its own evidentiary hearing.
DATED this^Xl day of Ocfofa&U-2009.
TERIKEETCH

TtTOMAS KEETCH
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^V)

day of jQ^^M|r2009 ) I mailing a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to the following:
M. Kent Mecham, Esq.
Mecham & Associates, Chartered
7830 North 23rd Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85021

//
, ^# c' ti*ki
[
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Dated: December 24,2009

1

State Bar No. 005738
2 M. KENT MECHAM
MECHAM & ASSOCIATES, CHARTERJD_
3 7830 North 23 ld Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85021
4
(€02) 246-7626
5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
6

Svv^/i^u^vCY-4-u
EYT
SARAH S. CURLEYf
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

7
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9
10
11

In Re:

NO. 2:07-bk-02532-SSC
(Chapter 7}

THOMAS R. KEETCH and
T E R I L . KEETCH,

Adv. No.2:07~ap-00509-SSC

12
Debtors.

13

JUDGMENT
14
15

PAUL A. TIMOTHY and JANICE
TIMOTHY, husband and wife,

16
Plaintiffs,

17
18

vs.

19

THOMAS R. KEETCH and
TERI L. KEETCH,

20
21

Defendants.

22
23
24

This matter having come on for hearing on Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment;

25

26
21
28

Plaintiffs appearing by and through their attorney, M.
KENT MECHAM; Defendant, Teri L. Keetch, appearing telephonically;
The

court

having

considered

86304032221018

the

Motion,

with

its

1 accompanying
2

accompanying

documents,

the

documents; and

Response
the

Reply

to
to

the
the

Motion

with

Response

with

3
accompanying documents, and the oral argument of the parties;

4

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the debt owing

5

6 to the Plaintiffs' Paul A. Timothy and Janis Timothy, husband
7
wife, by the Defendants Thomas R. Keetch and Teri L. Keetch, is a
8
9 non-dischargeable debt pursuant to 11 USC §523(a) (2) (A); and
10

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED granting

11
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as
12
follows:

13
14
15

1.

Principal of $75,451.17;

2.

Interest as of January 13, 2009 of $12,738.82 with

16
interest continuing to accrue thereon from January 13, 2009 at the

17

rate of 7.49% per annum until paid in full;

18
19

3.

Costs of collection of $1,600.00;

4.

Post-judgment interest from 6 M a y 2009 a t t h e rate

20
21
of 2 . 4 % on all interest owed a n d costs o f suit o w e d ;

22
23 jj
24

5.

Attorney's fees of $ 6 2 , 9 1 5 . 7 6 , with i n t e r e s t on the

attorney's fees at the rate o f 2 . 4 % p e r annum from 2 0 J u l y 2 0 0 9 ;

25

26

and

27 ||
28

X/S^nin7P?pini «

6.

This judgment shall b e augmented in t h e a m o u n t of

1 reasonable attorney's fees and costs expended collecting said
2 judgment by execution or otherwise.
3
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

4

5
6
7

JUDGE

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

86304032221027

day of December, 2009.
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